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NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

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FRENCH-ISRAELI INVESTMENT AGREEMENT SIGNED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 10 Jun 83 p 16

[Text] France and Israel yesterday signed an agreement to encourage investment. The agreement was concluded at a meeting of the countries' joint economic committees 1 year ago; but the signing, scheduled for February, was delayed by the French Foreign Ministry, as part of the sanctions against Israel due to the war in Lebanon. The commercial attache at the Israeli embassy in Paris, Eldad Gat, said that the signing is the expression of a compromise in the economic relations between the two countries, and that the agreement--France has similar agreements with other countries--is of great importance to Israeli firms.

In 2 days, a French delegation of 10 will arrive in Israel, comprised of representatives from various government offices, led by the head of the Middle East division of the French Foreign Ministry, and former Ambassador to Israel, Mark Bonfous. The delegation will participate in a second session of the joint committee. The agreement was signed in Paris yesterday by Yo'el Sar, who had power of attorney for Israel, and representatives of the French Foreign and Finance Ministries. The agreement is still subject to approval by the Knesset and the French National Assembly. It protects investments made in both countries from expropriations, take-over and damages incurred during war or perpetrated by any other hostile party. It also guarantees appropriate compensation when called for. The agreement also facilitates the free transfer of interest, dividends and profits from investment and other income; as well as loan payments, investment capital and compensation. The agreement further allows for the transfer of some income earned by foreign workers in both countries to their countries of origin. What's more, the agreement guarantees lenient issuance of entry visas, work permits and temporary resident status to citizens of both countries, when investments are involved.

Eldad Gat further indicated that in the first quarter of this year, Israeli exports to France increased to \$80 million, as compared with \$70 million last year.

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HARIF COMMENTARY ON BEGIN'S CONDITION

TA221458 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 22 Jul 83 p 13

[Commentary by Yosef Harif: "Believe me," Begin said to the Staff of His Office, 'In my Current Condition I Do Not Feel I Would Be Able to Carry Out the Mission Perfectly"]

[Text] The puzzle that has been occupying Israeli politics this week--just what is hiding behind the "personal reasons" for which Prime Minister Menahem Begin asking President Reagan to postpone his next week's visit to Washington--is not without a solution.

In fact, the prime minister himself dwelt on the solution when, a few hours before he phoned Reagan, he admitted to his confidants, when they tried to influence him to go on the visit after all, a visit whose date had been set by the U.S. President: "Believe me," Begin said, "I do not feel that, in my current condition, I can carry out the mission perfectly, as I am used to doing and as I want and know how it should be done...."

What is the meaning of "in my current condition?"

Do you feel all right? he was asked by one of his confidants.

"Yes," was the answer.

What, then is the "current condition?"

This is nothing other than that Begin himself recognizes the fact that his current appearance, which radiates sorrow and a feeling of depression, is not the "deal" appearance with which to appear before such a high ranking host as the U.S. President, not to mention the media, which would have aimed its spotlights on every one of his movements and gestures. His body is thinner and his smiles are forced, and it seemed that instead of the "cruel" U.S. media dealing with the visit's topic and content, it would have dealt entirely with his appearance, his health, and his movements, and it is easy to assume that this treatment would not have been the most flattering.

Even if there is no truth to the claim that his deep depression is affecting his functioning and decisionmaking, there is no doubt that the U.S. media

would have "finished" Menahem Begin. Is there any political figure whatsoever who would have walked into such a situation with open eyes?....

At first there was an attempt to explain Begin's nondeparture for Washington as also a desire to put Reagan in his place: In the winter, Begin was scheduled to go to Washington at Reagan's invitation, and "at the last minute" the visit was cancelled. Not only did the administration not do anything to convince anyone that the postponement of this visit had no political significance, but "anonymous" officials took the trouble to brief the communications media that the postponement of Menahem Begin's visit was by way of punishing his policy in Lebanon. So now, when Reagan is expecting to receive the prime minister in Washington, Begin, as it were, wants to "show him...."

There is no doubt that Begin does not generally tend to forget such conduct toward the "prime minister of Israel" (beyond the personal sensitivity), but it does not appear that he is "settling accounts" with the U.S. President at such a time.

Israel's ambassador in Washington tried to clarify with the U.S. administration what the significance was of the proximity of Lebanese President Amin Al-Jumayyil's visit to the White House and Begin's visit. The administration's answer was that it was nothing but "coincidence," and there was no political intention behind this overlap. However, even if this is not absolutely precise, as is assumed in Jerusalem, Israel did not see fit to enter into the depths of this problem when Begin had decided not to go to Washington anyway. As will be recalled, before Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir went to Washington several months ago, "somehow or other" the Lebanese foreign minister also arrived there at the same time. It turned out that there was somebody in the administration who tended to believe that the two foreign ministers could be made to meet, and thus advance an arrangement between Lebanon and Israel.

Somebody raised the claim that Begin did not regard the trip as important because, in fact, there was not much to talk about with the U.S. President a short time after Secretary of State George Shultz had been here. And, apart from this, when there has recently been almost full understanding between Washington and Jerusalem over the question of Lebanon, it seems that there is no basis for such a claim. Any meeting between the prime minister and the U.S. President is very important. All the more so since, according to the plans for that visit, if it had taken place, the prime minister was to have talked with Reagan about reviving the important clauses in the memorandum of strategic understanding achieved about a year ago and which was not formally put into effect, about increasing the economic aid to Israel, about matters of security and procurement, and about everything, including understanding Syria's position, a Syria which enjoys the protection of the Soviet Union and its air force, and is flooded with Soviet advisers and pilots.

Do all these things make the visit "unimportant?"

It is true that in the practical sphere coordination could have been reached between the United States and Israel without a personal visit to Washington by the prime minister. But there is no doubt at all that Begin's visit at such a time of goodwill, as was awaiting him in Washington, could have made a great contribution toward strengthening the personal friendship between Begin and Reagan, who, according to all the signs, is planning to "run" for a second term of office as U.S. President. Perhaps there could have been a reassessment, this time together, of the situation in the Middle East.

However, Begin also believes that apparently very soon the "current situation" will change and then he will be able to visit Washington, and not one of the matters he was going to discuss with President Reagan will be harmed.

The truth is that even a month ago, or even before that, the prime minister was not inclined to go to Washington on the date suggested by the White House (27 July). In his reply to President Reagan, the prime minister wrote that he was happy to respond to the invitation, and he hoped to go to the United States on the proposed date, "if the situation permits." However, from the practical viewpoint, nothing was done indicating an interest in going to the United States. When the prime minister's aides used to ask him a certain question touching on the trip for the purpose of preparing it, he would answer: "There is time...." and this was also his answer in the weeks before the set date. About a week before the visit Israel had not yet replied to Washington on the proposed timetable, as is the custom when coordinating a state visit between two countries.

In the end, on Tuesday, 19 July, the prime minister became aware that there was no longer any possibility of dragging matters out any longer, and then he disclosed to his advisers that he did not intend to go to Washington. There was somebody who tried to influence him to think about the matter again, since nobody would understand the decision, not to mention the fact that the opposition would take advantage of the matter for a serious attack against him ("You can spend hours speaking with Secretary of State Shultz in your office and you cannot speak with President Reagan in the White House?"). But Begin riposted: "It does not matter. We will have to stand up to the foul storm of cruel speculation...."

There was somebody from the prime minister's side who commented that he actually thought the opposition would not make a "big deal" out of the postponement of the visit, but Begin "soothed" him: No, you are wrong, as one who knows them, I know they are capable of anything and especially of goring, demeaning and causing pain....I am sure that they (the opposition) will take advantage of this issue to the very end. If they take advantage, let them. We will also stand up to that...the heavens are not falling....

And during the afternoon of Tuesday, 19 July, 9 AV [the Hebrew date of a religious fast day], he asked his secretary Yehi'el Qadishay, to connect him with the White House....

What Begin wanted to say to Reagan was clear to all the prime minister's aides. Nobody knew how Begin would explain the postponement. That same morning he was advised to use all sorts of reasons, but after the talk with Reagan, Begin surprised everyone. He phoned his office and informed his aides about the talk and disclosed to them that he had explained his request to postpone the visit by "personal reasons."

It was then that the strong whirlpool of rumors and interpretations began, and the prime minister's office had to convince everyone that there was no question of health. Nobody knows just when the excuse of "personal reasons" was born, but it is clear that Begin used it in order to take all responsibility upon himself in view of his aides' complaint that they would find it difficult to explain the reason for the postponement. Well, that is the prime minister's private business, and in any event they were released from explanations....

It seems that although Begin was prepared for the reaction of the opposition and the media, he did not imagine that it would be so sharp (the immediate digging into the state of health of the prime minister, who was described by Mk 'Uzi Bar'am as a "weakened weapon").

What do you have to say about this wave? Begin asked his secretary.

Well, after all, you said "We will also get over that...."

Begin did not remain indifferent to the storm at home. But what hurt him more than anything else was the fact that inside his own cabinet there were commentators like that "senior minister" who took advantage of the opportunity and volunteered a biased interpretation of his own; "the depression Begin is undergoing sometimes makes it difficult for him to function."

Begin said: Who knows who the "senior minister" is. I know that there are three senior ministers--the defense minister, the foreign minister and the minister of finance.... In my opinion, Ya'akov Meridor is also one, a senior minister, but I am sure that not one of them would say those slanderous things.... And, in a sarcastic tone of voice, Begin added: "Perhaps we have one more senior minister under the table, one we know nothing about, who is capable of saying such things....

When the prime minister went to the special cabinet session on Wednesday morning, 20 July, he did not settle accounts with any one of the "senior" ministers, and perhaps the paper whose headline had given the news of his "depression" was not yet in front of him. Begin just apologized for not having informed the cabinet members about postponing the visit before reporting it to President Reagan. In any event, it was apparent that he had a feeling of relief from the moment he told this to the U.S. President and Reagan replied in a good spirit that together they would coordinate a new date for the visit. The cabinet members testified that that time the prime minister's alertness during the session, which had been convened to approve the general staff plan for a new deployment of IDF forces in Lebanon, was conspicuous.

If we judge by the external signs, the prime minister is now making an effort to prove that he really is functioning as he should, despite the signs of sadness that have been apparent on his face all the time recently. If this is really so, it is something we will know within the next few days. If he continues to shut himself up inside his office and all his trips outside are just to attend memorial services, as has happened recently; and if he continues to stay away from the microphones and the media; then even if his functioning is in order, as Minister Aharon Uzan repeated this week, then his "personal reasons" will continue to exist. Even if these reasons are understandable, from the human aspect, they do not befit a head of state at any time, and all the more so at a time when the country is loaded down with problems. If within a few days, if not weeks, Menahem Begin does not put aside his crestfallen visage, it seems that even those on his side who have great hopes, whether in the Cabinet or the Knesset, will reach a state of despair, with all that that presages at a time when the question of dissolving the Knesset and holding new elections is occupying the political parties.

Those among the Cabinet members who incline to think that Begin has begun to return to himself, and the postponement of the U.S. visit is no sign of weakness but just the opposite--on the assumption that as well as the "personal reasons," Begin wanted to straighten out the situation here before going to Washington--are pointing to this Wednesday's Cabinet session.

At that session a decision was unanimously approved about implementing the first stage of withdrawal in Lebanon, in such a way as to serve Israel's security interests and, at the same time, not to harm Israel's agreement with Lebanon, to which the United States is a guarantor.

Whether coincidentally or not, the Cabinet session was held the day after the announcement on postponing the visit. And because everybody knows that the complications in the war in Lebanon--some of them the fault of the failed mediation of Reagan's envoy, Philip Habib--were what had, to a great extent, influenced the prime minister's mood (the "personal reasons"), it may be that this initiative by Begin to lead to an arrangement in Lebanon, as Israel understands it--in the awareness that there is no ideal arrangement, just a relatively convenient one--is a step in his conscious personal effort to get out of that mood, which seems to have left its mark on his face and his entire personality.

The question is asked: Why was it impossible to have this week's Cabinet decision earlier? When Begin was asked this question, he said that this would have angered the Americans and made it easier for Lebanon to get out of fulfilling its commitments in the agreement with Israel.

Now, Begin states, neither the Lebanese nor the Americans can claim that they were not given enough time to get organized and plan to take back the territory being evacuated. After all, the Lebanese have been claiming all along that they want sovereignty over their country returned to them. You want sovereignty? Here it is. They can take all the territory to be

evacuated by Israel. They cannot say they do not want to take the territory we evacuate. Otherwise, what about your sovereignty?....

The prime minister tested the Cabinet decision about the IDF redeployment in Lebanon with great caution (in fact, the Cabinet only made a decision in principle, while the details were left to the determination of the prime minister, defense minister and foreign minister). This hints at the fact that within the next few days the issue will be at the center of the contacts with the United States and Lebanon, in order to achieve coordination before Israel begins to implement the first stage of the withdrawal.

It is clear to the United States that if it does not signal to Lebanon to reach understanding with Israel, Israel will act unilaterally. This was also said to the U.S. secretary of state, George Shultz, during his visit to Jerusalem 3 weeks ago, when he returned from Damascus and made a full admission that he had failed in his mission. It was possible to understand from Shultz that if Israel implemented a new IDF deployment in Lebanon, the United States would honor it. This may not be regarded as full coordination, but from Israel's viewpoint, this was sufficient to instruct the chief of staff to complete the plans and bring them to the Cabinet for approval.

In a talk the prime minister held with U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis a short time after the Cabinet session, Begin explained the substance of the decision and interpreted the IDF deployment plan to him. It is to be assumed that Begin repeated his statement to the U.S. ambassador that Israel was leaving sufficient time for the United States and Lebanon to coordinate the withdrawal, so as to facilitate filling in the vacuum created by the IDF withdrawal.

The Cabinet decision of this Wednesday, 20 July, is of course no less a "U.S. problem" than a Lebanese one. To date the Americans have sent their advisers to Lebanon to help it establish an army, and they have also trained Lebanese units in the United States. But the Americans know very well what the power of the Lebanese Army is. Once they thought--and they also said so to us in order to encourage us to withdraw the IDF--that within "weeks" they would rehabilitate the Lebanese Army. Now they no longer tell us that. One can only hope they will succeed in creating a Lebanese Army within months.

It is true that the Lebanese foreign minister ignores the agreement with Israel in his statements, but in a talk this week by Israeli Ambassador to Washington Dr Me'ir Rosenne with decisive elements in the administration, it was explained to him in the clearest way that the United States adhered to the Lebanese-Israeli agreement achieved through Secretary of State Shultz. And this means that Washington does not think that the IDF deployment contradicts the agreement between Lebanon and Israel, in principle.

The Americans, of course, fear that harm will come to their Marines if the IDF evacuates some of its current positions, but they also know that Israel has made up its mind to implement what it decided upon this week. Israel is explaining to the Americans that this is a question of credibility, and if Lebanon knows that the IDF really does intend to evacuate the territories mentioned, they will have to coordinate moves with Israel and the United States.

Following Wednesday's Cabinet decision, Washington will have to make new calculations. To date it has come to realize that it is incapable of getting Syria to budge from its position. Washington's limited contacts with Moscow, for the latter to influence the Syrians, did not help it. The United States is not interested in broader and more thorough contacts, because this would mean opening a dialogue about all the problems of the Middle East and turning the Soviet Union into a partner equal to the United States. The United States has, superficially, one alternative left to it: To try to convince Al-Jumayyil to speak with the Israelis.

To date, Shultz has hesitated to do this. Israel raised the idea to him, that of isolating Syria and tightening the tripartite U.S.-Lebanese-Israeli link, but the U.S. secretary of state replied that the Lebanese must be considered; they cannot take a step which would lead to Syria's isolation, because then Lebanon would find itself isolated, noting the fact that its economic needs also rely on Syria.

This may be so. But Israel cannot take everybody's sensitivities into account. It must look after itself, first of all. Coordination--yes, but not without a time limitation. This is the significance of the Cabinet decision that was made this week in accordance with the prime minister's proposal.

If Begin were to go to Washington, he would say similar things. Because he is not going, he said them the day after his announcement of the postponement, and on the eve of President al-Jumayyil's arrival at the White House. As a result, at least from this aspect, the postponement of the prime minister's visit to the United States has not caused any damage. And despite the "personal reasons" that prevented Begin from going to the United States, he functioned on this vital matter as he should.

CSO: 4400/437

BEN-ELI'EZER'S POLICY ANALYZED

TA220736 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 22 Jul 83 p 7

[Commentary by David Richardson: "Chance for Change"]

[Text] The appointment of Tat Aluf (Brigadier General) (res.) Binyamin Bel-Eli'ezer as the new coordinator of activities in the administered territories presents, at the very least, an opportunity for badly needed changes in the West Bank and Gaza. In choosing a man with strongly-held and freely-expressed opinions on the issues Israel confronts in its relationship with the Palestinians, Defence Minister Moshe Arens is also revealing something of himself.

The appointment of Fu'ad, (as he is known by both Arabs and Israelis) could, however, just as easily be no more than the beginning of a new cycle of events similar to the 5 years of decline in relations which followed the Camp David accords.

In several interviews Ben-Eli'ezer granted shortly before his appointment as coordinator was confirmed, he repeated what has become the conventional wisdom of that office.

The duty of the professional administrators in the Defence Ministry and the military government/civil administration in the West Bank and Gaza was basically to keep open all options of an eventual solution entertained by the mainstream of Israeli politics.

What was clearly outside the Israeli consensus was, and still is, a (PLO-dominated) independent Palestinian state.

But in one such interview, Ben-Eli'ezer went a step further than most of his predecessors: "We have no choice," he said. "We have to strive for calm since only calm will bring a solution and that can be all of Eretz Yisra'el or a Palestinian state," he told REHOV RASHI last Friday.

People who know Ben-Eli'ezer well claim that he advocates neither of these alternatives. Well, what then is he doing serving a government which does not hide its ideological commitment to greater Israel and its consequent implacable opposition to an independent Falastin?

It was, after all, disagreement over the main tool of the government's policy--the settlements--which prevented Arens' first choice for the position, Aluf (Major General) (res.) Refa'el Vardi from taking up the position.

Political wags have it that Ben-Eli'ezer has not given up his own political ambitions, which were apparently frustrated or disappointed in Tami. In their view, the former army officer wants to launch himself into mainstream Israeli politics through the territories, possibly strapped to that currently grounded pilot 'Ezer Weizman.

If he succeeds, so much the better. If he fails, he can always slam the door as he goes blaming the government's ideologically burdened policies, the wags speculate.

But even if Fu'ad has political ambitions of his own, and they are legitimate, his appointment has its own significance. His intentions, at least as the village leagues are concerned, are diametrically opposed to those advocated by the man most closely associated with them, Prof Menahem Milson.

Ben-Eli'ezer, who left the army when the civil administration was introduced under Milson, has referred to the village leagues as "scarecrows" and "quislings" and makes no bones about the fact that the real Palestinian leadership in the West Bank is only to be found in the towns.

He has already stated that one of his first priorities is to restore Arabs to the municipalities of the West Bank from which they were dismissed as a result of their boycott of the civil administration.

It is no secret that established interests, linked with established families in the towns who were displaced by the more radical pro-PLO mayors and councils elected in 1976, are waiting in the wings. These interests and families are, almost by definition, pro-Jordanian.

In this Fu'ad is being assisted by Tal Aluf Shlomo Ilia, the civil administrator of Judaea and Samaria, who, even in the eyes of the local population, is not to "blame" for the village leagues and everything associated with them.

Ilia, after all, inherited this situation and he has been careful not to generate the kind of expectations that were associated with them when they were first introduced in a big way over 18 months ago.

Ilia has also already made some progress in breaking the boycott of the civil administration.

Both Ben-Eli'ezer and Ilia have also said that they are quite prepared to talk to anyone on the West Bank, even the most radically pro-PLO figures such as Bassam Al-Shak'ah and his colleagues on the now outlawed National Guidance Committee.

Excuses and explanations aside, the introduction of the civil administration was accompanied by a nadir as far as a dialogue with a cross-section of the local population was concerned. Apart from the village leagues, the people in the civil administration headquarters, to all intents and purposes, stopped talking to other Palestinians.

And beyond the civil administrators, there was nothing. For the first time in 16 years of the Israeli administration of the territories, Israeli political leaders--those in power that is--had no meetings whatsoever with acknowledged Palestinian personalities.

In the 5 years Prime Minister Menahem Begin has led the country, he has met with two Palestinian leaders (apart from the village league founder and leader Mustafa Dudin) as far as is known--Rashad al-Shawwa of Gaza, and Ilyas Frayj of Bethlehem. Hardly a dialogue with the 1.3 million people he insists on referring to as the "Arabs of Eretz Yisra'el."

Ben-Eli'ezer, then, presumably with his minister's sanction, will be trying to reestablish such a dialogue with authentic leaders in the area. At the same time, he will be able to use the opportunity presented by his predecessor's removal of the more troublesome of those among the elected leaders to restore the traditional leadership to power and influence.

These figures and Ben-Eli'ezer and Ilia will also be able to count on groups of young academics and professionals who have been openly advocating a pragmatic approach to a settlement with Israel.

Unlike the traditional leaders, the younger professionals are not bound to the Jordanian throne and their basic commitment is still to Palestinian self-determination.

But they are partly the political expression, of an increasingly widespread disenchantment and disaffection with Arab politics in general and Palestinian politics in particular that one finds among the burgeoning young bourgeoisies of Nablus, Ramallah and Bethlehem.

These young people have, for the most part, known only Israel. Their fancy motor cars, expensive clothes, their patronage of the better restaurants of Tel Aviv and their regular trips abroad attest to a concern with other aspects of life apart from the cafeteria intensity of radical West Bank student politics.

If all this comes about, Ben-Eli'ezer will have created conditions which, for want of a better term, could be described as some form of autonomy without inviting what would still be the instantly negative response to anything associated with Camp David.

But there is a catch for all the players involved--primarily for the Palestinians.

If Ben-Eli'ezer succeeds, a renewed political process will be set in motion among Palestinians in the territories. No one pretends that their current situation under an acknowledged military occupation is endlessly tenable. There will be changes, real or perceived, which will raise hopes, and the hopes will generate demands.

Much will then depend on the Israeli response, and that response primarily lies with Arens.

A seasoned Palestinian observer once related that following the signing of the Camp David agreement there was an initial and genuine sense of expectation and euphoria among most people in the West Bank.

A senior official in the military government was able to trace and "summon" the then mayor of Ramallah, Karim Khalaf, an acknowledged radical from a family visit to Houston, Texas. The military government also encouraged an open rally at Bayt Hanina, where the Palestinian issues of the Camp David accords was to be discussed.

"The result was a resounding rejection--which was exactly what was intended," the Palestinian recounted with bitter admiration for what he saw as the Machiavellian manipulation of his people by Israeli Arab-affairs experts.

If Arens is faced by demands from even the moderate Palestinians which he cannot meet because of his political commitments to the right-wing within his coalition, the easiest path open to him is to give the Palestinian radicals a free hand.

The tone of their demands will become more strident, the shabab in the streets will respond, all the Palestinians will be branded as extreme and uncompromising, and the whole lot will be put down again. A cynical and pessimistic analysis of the past 5 years will bear out this analysis.

Whether this pattern is to repeat itself now depends on Ben-Eli'ezer, Arens and the Palestinians.

CSO: 4400/437

ARRANGEMENT WITH AGUDAT YISRA'EL TO AFFECT DORON

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 13 Jun 83 p 2

[Text] As a result of quiet negotiations conducted between representatives of Agudat Yisra'el and the Likud, a compromise was reached to include MK Sara Doron in the government. According to the agreement--which is not yet finalized--the "Archaeology Law" will be presented to the Knesset for approval in the next few days, while the "Who Is a Jew" law will be presented at the beginning of the winter session. The latter will be supported by the Likud and the liberal faction. A letter to this effect was drafted for Agudat Yisra'el and will be signed by the Prime Minister. If the agreement is implemented, the four Agudat Yisra'el Knesset members will support MK Doron's appointment to the government.

The contacts for the agreement were made over the last 6 weeks between Minister of Justice Moshe Nisim and the head of the Agudat Yisra'el faction, MK Avraham Shapira. Agudat Yisra'el will meet today to discuss the details of the agreement. A team of lawyers for the Likud and Agudat Yisra'el is working on acceptable wording of the Archaeology Law, which, as mentioned above, will be brought to the Knesset for approval along with Doron's appointment as minister. What's more, paragraph 83 of the coalition agreement, on the basis of which Prime Minister Begin committed himself to work toward correcting the Who Is a Jew law, will be changed. It will be worded in such a way that Agudat Yisra'el will be able to call it a victory. The Liberal representatives will draft the letter which Mr Begin will be asked to sign. For Agudat Yisra'el, the letter will be proof of the government's guarantee that the change in the law will receive majority Knesset support.

The negotiations between Agudat Yisra'el and the Likud on this issue were conducted in a friendly atmosphere, although behind the scenes, Rabbi Magor's ultimatum forbidding Agudat Yisra'el MKs from voting for Sara Doron's appointment to the government loomed continually. Rabbi Magor (and with him other circles in Agudat Yisra'el) is waiting for the Who Is a Jew law to pass in the Knesset. If this next attempt to pass the law fails--it is inevitable that Magor will instruct the Agudat Yisra'el faction to leave the coalition. Yesterday, reporters could not reach MK Avraham Shapira to get his reaction--and Minister of Justice Nisim refused to comment on the issue.

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LAND EXPROPRIATIONS MAY BE ILLEGAL

Tel Aviv KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew 15 Jun 83 p 7

[Text] State Comptroller Yitzhaq Tuniq wrote a devastating report, in which he criticized the government's activities and initiatives regarding acquiring land from the Arabs in Judaea and Samaria. For 2 weeks now a bitter parliamentary struggle has been raging between the opposition and the coalition, about publishing details from the report. The coalition is seeking to suppress publication of the findings while the opposition is struggling to have the major data published.

According to international law and the Hague Pact, the government has no right to buy land on the West Bank; notwithstanding, it has purchased around 70,000 dunams: 50,000 from residents whose land ownership is not registered or legal; 20,000 from people who had title documents. In his report, the State Comptroller reveals for the first time the existence of "volunteers" who acted as interlocutors between the government and the Arabs who claimed land ownership. The Comptroller levels harsh criticism against the volunteers, who charged an agents fee of around 10 percent on each deal. That money found its way into the volunteers' pockets. At issue, apparently, are some exceedingly high figures. The report found that the land deals were not made based on sound rules of business. "It is not fitting for the government to be involved in such practices," says the Comptroller.

KOTERET RASHIT has discovered that all the private land requisitions on the West Bank, which roused a loud public outcry, amounted to 4,000 dunams. The government fears that the Comptroller's report of illegalities and dubious acquisitions by the government will jeopardize West Bank settlement programs.

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BRIEFS

TV NEWS DEBATE PROGRAM--Starting tonight the late TV news programme will include a short debate on a controversy of the day. The debate will be hosted by Dan Raviv, Israel TV's former Washington correspondent, who returned from the U.S. last year. Raviv had tried to institute the change since then, but he faced opposition from news announcers and the journalists' works committee. These opponents believed that would have less opportunity for overtime payments, since reporters rotated as newsreaders on the late-night news show. Undisclosed arrangements with the journalists led them to withdraw their opposition. The new programme will be called Koteret Layla ("Evening Headlines"). Meanwhile, two groups--one based in Tel Aviv and another in Netanya--have announced that they will demonstrate against what they call Israel TV's "lack of objectivity" from 4 to 7 p.m. today in Jerusalem's Ben-Yehuda mall. Maoz, an organization that fights Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, and a group called "The Association for the Security of Israel" are organizing the protest. They claim that TV portrays Russian Jewry, the Lebanon War, Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria and other issues in an "unbalanced" way. [Text] [Article by Judy Siegel] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 17 Jul 83 p 3]

WATER PROJECT; HIGHER TARIFFS--Herzliya--Herzliya residents are to pay 140 per cent more for their water, to partially cover costs of a project that will bring water from the Samaria foothills and hopefully, prevent local wells from turning saline. The wells on which the city draws have fallen to 25 metres below sea level after Mekorot, the national water company, provided only 7.5 million of 30 million cubic metres of water it had promised to the municipality. The project is to bring water from Samaria, on which work has begun, will result in sweet water being funneled into the municipality's underground reservoirs. The cost of the project is IS130 million, 40 per cent of this amount is to be funded from government sources, 40 per cent by the water administration of the local authorities, and the rest from higher tariffs for consumers. [Text] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 17 Jul 83 p 6]

TRADE DEFICIT UP 31 PERCENT--Israel's trade deficit (the difference between imports and exports) rose during the first 5 months of this year by 31 percent as compared with the same period last year. The deficit amounted to \$1,439 million. Imports during the same period reached \$3,447 million while exports totaled only \$2,008 million. The increased deficit, which totaled \$343 million, is the result of a \$198 million decrease in exports (9 percent) and a \$145 million increase in imports (4 percent) since the beginning of the year. Data from the Bureau of Statistics, which were reported yesterday, indicate that the deficit might have been even greater if there had not

been an almost 30 percent reduction in oil imports by the State. The balance continued to weaken through the month of May, with a 14 percent increase in the deficit over the month of April. The deficit in May reached \$389 million--\$80 million more than in May of last year. The rising trend in the trade deficit has been continuous since October 1982. During April and May, the average monthly level of the trade deficit was 24 percent higher than the monthly average for the first quarter of the year. During the first 5 months, imports of basic goods rose by 25 percent. Car imports rose 48 percent, [word missing in text] by 36 percent and diamond imports by 74 percent. Trade exports declined from January to May by 9 percent. Export-import investment capital rose by [phrase missing in text] industrial investments declined by 13 percent, agricultural exports by 12 percent while diamond exports rose by 9 percent. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew
10 Jun 83 pp 1, 11] 9811

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LEBANON

COMMUNIST LEADER DISCUSSES REVIVAL OF NATIONAL ACTION

Paris AL-YASAR AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 55, Jun 83 pp 6-7

[Interview with Muhsin Ibrahim, Lebanese Communist Action Organization's Central Committee Secretary General: "Our Option Is To Follow Line of Armed National Resistance to Israeli Occupation and To Organize Democratic National Opposition to Fascism; Our Slogan Is To Revive Frontal National Action on Basis of Independent Lebanese Decision"; Paris AL-YASAR AL-'ARABI in Arabic; monthly organ of the Egyptian Communist Party]

[Text] [Question] What is your position vis-a-vis the Lebanese-Israeli accord and what are this accord's consequences to Lebanon? What is a struggler's reply to this Lebanese-Israeli accord which was signed on 17 May 1983 under the patronage of the United States as another step on the course which both the Lebanese and Arab situations entered as of last summer in wake of the invasion which is now undergoing its first anniversary?

[Answer] This agreement is, naturally, received with utter condemnation and denunciation by our organization and by the Lebanese nationalists. We have been declaring ceaselessly and for a long time that we will not recognize and will not give legitimacy to any results intended to be entrenched as a fait accompli against our country's national fate under the pressure of the flawed balance of forces which has been imposed by aggression at the local and regional levels. Proceeding on the basis of our awareness of the nature of the phase which our homeland has entered since that date /of aggression/, our organization has been a forerunner in calling for rejecting and obstructing the negotiations which later led to the said accord, especially since we have a precise example in Egypt's experience and realize that the negotiations seek to revive a new form of Camp David. Our organization has also viewed the course adopted by the Lebanese regime in dealing with the outcome of the U.S.-Israeli aggression as a course that entrenches the imbalance created by the aggression with regard to the internal forces through the persistent efforts to build a sectarian, factional and fascist system of government and, second, as a course that ignores all the elements with which the Arab situation still throbs in confronting the ferocious U.S. onslaught and, third, as a course of full surrender to Washington which has clearly played the role of the full partner of Israel in every moment of the previous phase.

This is why I say that our organization is not, naturally, surprised by the outcome reflected in the ill-reputed accord and why it does not view the accord as being separate from the context which has generated it. The organization certainly calls for foiling the accord, for supporting the struggle of our people who are devoted to liberating and uniting Lebanon and for advancing the democratic option in Lebanon.

In this respect, let me hasten to affirm that the Lebanese Communist Action Organization does not consider signing the agreement the end of the road. Before and since the accord, the organization has called for the adoption of an advanced struggle plan that proceeds from understanding the new changes developing in our situation toward action that creates gradual changes in the balance of forces and that gradually introduces new facts into the general political equation on the path of true Lebanese national steadfastness embraced by Arab circumstances that must also begin their development procession.

In the course of answering this first question, I do not want to answer the reactionary and rightist propaganda campaign which accompanied, inside and outside Lebanon, the conclusion and signing of the humiliating accord, a campaign which, by necessity, tried to depict this accord as the only option open to Lebanon. It is enough for me to reassert that the U.S.-Israeli policy toward Lebanon and the Phalangist readiness to implement this policy introduces Lebanon anew to an extremely complex phase. Lebanon's national independence is endangered, the unity of its territories is threatened and the future of its people rests on a demon's palm. It is no exaggeration to say that Lebanon, with its present complex situation, is the source of enormous dangers threatening the Arab liberation movement in its entirety.

This is why our organization has urged itself and all the fundamental Lebanese national forces to study profoundly the outcome of the whole surgery to which Lebanon's body has been subjected under the supervision of the U.S.-Israeli-Phalangist "medical consultation board." This is also why our organization has urged itself and the national forces to realize that though weakened, they still hold a firm position at the popular level and to abandon finally destructive illusions--illusions which, in any case, have been so far the main cause of the "crisis" faced by the joint national action for the past few years. This crisis intensified with the invasion and permitted adoption of the resolution to freeze the organizational formula of frontal /jabhawi/ action in Lebanon.

Our organization notes that our focusing the lights on the total developments has, in addition to all the objective given facts, created better conditions for advanced national action. All this explains to a large extent the relative revival of national action, the growing popular support for this action (increasing operations by the armed national resistance, uprisings and Mount Lebanon's steadfastness) and the rapidly crystallizing positions of the national opposition in the past few weeks.

We are raising the slogan of reviving frontal national action on the basis of understanding the independent position of our national cause and of crystallizing independent Lebanese national decision. Relying on all this, we are confident, by necessity, that it is possible to formulate a joint action plan. This is why we have welcomed all the stances and voices rejecting what is being planned for Lebanon and why we have called for holding a leadership-level dialogue in Beirut for the establishment of a central frontal formula in the Lebanese capital to express at this time the aspirations of all true patriots.

We see no conflict between the goal of reviving the frontal national action and the goal of combining the forces, factions and notables within a broader framework that agrees on a general political position and that is flexible in its practical formula.

It is natural to say, finally, that it is very important to explain this conclusion. The Egyptian nationalists are best able to understand the meaning of this insistence on the independent Lebanese national position and the meaning of the insistence on creating the joint formula "at home." All this is a measure of the credibility of what we have discussed and have abided by. We will then demand that full support be given to the struggle of the people rallying behind these inclinations.

Question/ What are your expectations for Lebanon and the area in the coming period?

Answer/ There is no doubt that I have answered in the preceding part a number of issues concerning expectations. To put it briefly, we say that we again expect a new and complex phase. The reason for its complexity is that the hostile scheme possesses still more cards, especially within the Arab framework generally. We must expect imperialist attempts to resume the hostile assault, using the imbalance existing currently to cause new links to drop at the Arab level and to besiege other positions in order to achieve the dream of U.S. imperialism to spread its domination over the Middle East and to build its new regional order, with Israel as its mainstay.

This is why I expect Lebanon to be once more the arena of a plot seeking to complete Lebanon's fragmentation and its annexation to the hostile domination plan. I also expect the pressures to intensify in order to pave the way at the Arab level. It can be imagined that Jordan is preparing to become the third link after Egypt and Lebanon.

All this will happen while the Arab reactionary axis is exposing its face more and more and openly declaring its connection with the U.S. scheme and while concerted reactionary efforts are exerted to build "Arab solidarity" as a reactionary alliance with Washington. We are clearly referring to the reactionary Egyptian-Jordanian-Iraqi axis that is coordinating with the Saudi reaction which is preparing itself to undertake a general role in the area.

But I also see elements and obstacles in the face of the hostile imperialist domination plan. Efforts must be made to entrench these elements and obstacles, the first of which is the independent Lebanese national steadfastness that is /determined/ to continue and survive. The second is the continued resistance by the Palestinian national position under the leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the fraternal Palestinian people, and the continued unity of this position in order to embarrass all. The third is the continued Syrian national position confronting the imperialist scheme and fighting the pressures and the fourth is the firmness of Democratic Yemen's position in the Peninsula and the Gulf. But with this, I also underline the decisive Soviet position that is firm in its support for the steadfastness of these national positions and in confronting the U.S. scheme. This friendly and unreserved Soviet position is an extension of the principled Soviet policy which is aware of the dangers of U.S. domination and of the aggressiveness of this domination throughout the entire world on the one hand and which, on the other hand, is seeking to prevent the emergence of a scheme against peace in the area and throughout the world.

I expect, therefore, an attempt by U.S. imperialism to exploit its gains and "its assets" to complete its assault. At the same time, I expect the continued presence of actual obstacles in the face of the hostile scheme. Despite all this, the subsidiary contradictions between the America's Arabs and Israel must be utilized within the framework of the U.S. Middle East strategy.

But the revolutionary Arabs who are fighting a ferocious scheme and preparing themselves to build up given facts to bolster their steadfastness cannot, when the curtain is dropping on one phase of the history of the Arab national liberation movement, a phase of the bourgeois leadership of the liberation movement and of this class political leadership that is becoming less and less capable and that is falling finally--I say that the Arab revolutionaries are not wagering on strategic changes under the canopy of these conditions in the near future and within the framework of the currently existing formula. The wager of the Arab revolutionaries must rest ultimately on introducing a fundamental qualitative move in their own conditions and intrinsic structures, in their relations with the masses and in their dealing seriously with the issue of structural change in the Arab liberation movement. They must also confront the task of changing the current leadership in order to revive the liberation movement under a new revolutionary leadership. This is the opening key. The option of unifying the Arab revolutionary movement is on the touchstone.

So it is an extremely complex phase being undergone by our struggle. We must plan to obstruct and break the hostile assault on the path to the ultimate, certain and inevitable victory of our peoples.

/Question/ What is required of the Arab national forces?

/Answer/ I, in the name of our organization, ask the Arab national forces to support the Lebanese national struggle and the independence of the Lebanese national cause. The Lebanese nationalists are confident again that they have an independent national cause that has never failed to support the struggle of any other national liberation movement on Lebanon's soil. Liberating Lebanon, safeguarding its unity and building its democracy are the headlines of a Lebanese national cause for years to come. We ask the Arab national forces to launch a campaign of support for our struggle in Lebanon and for armed national resistance. We ask them to make this campaign penetrate the wall of silence, reluctance and collusion in the Arab world and to nurture the steadfastness of the Lebanese nationalists with the capabilities with which our Arab nation abounds. I call for developing all the forms /of struggle/ that have emerged at the Arab level so far in order that they may become more effective. The independence of the national positions within a general framework of linkage is essential. So that we may contribute to developing a plan for unified Arab revolutionary action, I renew the call, in the name of our organization, for the meeting of these forces without any delay in order that they may shoulder in this phase the courageous responsibility of evaluating what has happened and of making conclusions.

I take this occasion to laud the role of AL-YASAR AL-'ARABI, this genuine revolutionary podium, and its ceaseless efforts to manage an effective and purposeful dialogue among the Arab revolution's factions, I also greet the splendid comradely spirit with which the paper tackles all issues. We must all pledge to tackle all our issues with this spirit. In conclusion, this is an occasion for me to greet through AL-YASAR AL-'ARABI the great Egyptian people, their great national movement and the Egyptian vanguard on the path of the common and boundlessly devoted struggle.

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AL-KHALIJ INTERVIEWS FATAH'S SA'ID MUSA MURAGHA

GF041354 Ash-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 4 Jul 83 pp 16, 17

[Interview with Fatah military commander Col Sa'id Musa Muragha, alias Abu Musa, by Jum'ah al-Lami in the village of al-Hamarah in al-Biqa', Lebanon, on 24 June]

[Text] Al-Lami: However deep or serious the differences between you and Brother Yasir 'Arafat may be, Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] is still the chairman of the PLO Executive Committee and the representative of the legitimate Palestinian authority. What is your view of Syria's expulsion of 'Arafat?

Abu Musa: From the time we declared our opposition to the political line led by Brother Yasir 'Arafat, we were aware that he is unable to confront us militarily or organizationally. He wants to confront us militarily--we know his background and the way he deals with political issues on the Palestinian arena. We knew that he would use force against us and therefore we took our precautions. We also relied on the fact that the vast majority of Fatah rank-and-file members do not support 'Arafat's political stand and therefore will not support him militarily. Hence, we were sure that he would be unable to resolve the issue militarily.

Politically, we realize that 'Arafat has departed a great deal from [Fatah's] political program, principles and frameworks. Therefore, when we were calling for an extraordinary general congress we knew that he would evade it and this is what happened. He turned to the Arabs for support against the patriotic [watani] line within Fatah. We asked ourselves: What is the way out for Yasir 'Arafat? We believed that he would turn the matter from a Fatah or Palestinian issue into an Arab issue. We believe that he would blame Arabs and not the patriotic line within Fatah for his defeat. Hence, we expected him to clash with the Syrians, and expected him to push events toward a clash with the Syrians so that he would leave Lebanon or the region on the pretext that the Syrians are harassing him and on the pretext that it is the Syrians and not the nationalist [watani] forces within Fatah that disagree with his political line who are standing against him.

This is what in fact did happen. Following the recent problem in al-Masna' [on the Syrian-Lebanese border] he falsely claimed that the Syrians supported us. God knows how much we suffered that night as a result of the Syrians'

obstructions and the checkpoints they set up within our positions and threats to open fire at us if we do not cease fighting, when we were in fact defending ourselves. Eventually, we succeeded in pushing our brothers who were attacking us in the al-Masna' away from the main road so that we could have freedom of movement. We do not say we triumphed over them, but we say we pushed them back a little because they are under pressure from Yasir 'Arafat and Khalil al-Wazir and are under their leadership.

Thus we say that Yasir 'Arafat blamed the Syrians--while he was fully aware that the Syrians did not intervene--in order to push the Syrians to such a stand and to find an excuse for leaving the region and going to Tunisia or elsewhere. Yasir 'Arafat compelled the Syrians to take such a stand. Indeed, he began to attack and accuse the Syrians while he was still in Syria. If the Syrians had attacked his forces or obstructed him or exerted pressure on him, I would have said he has the right to say what he wants and his stand is correct. However, he knows that the Syrians did not intervene and yet he holds them responsible. Truly, this is not a correct political action.

Yasir 'Arafat has forced the Syrians to take their latest stand. We hope that Yasir 'Arafat will return to his senses and realize that the solution lies within Fatah and can be achieved only within Fatah. No Arab or non-Arab country can impose its will on us and force us to change our nationalist [watani] stand. This is because we are aware that our stand is the correct stand that saves the Palestinian national march. We will view any pressure on us as an opposing stand and we will oppose it whatever its source.

Al-Lami: Brother Abu Musa, there is a statement by Brother Yasir 'Arafat in which he said: When we were coordinating with the Syrian forces to confront the Israeli enemy, the Syrians stabbed us in the back and deceived us and supported the dissidents. You are in a responsible military position. Is there a Syrian-Palestinian military plan that has been drawn up by Fatah and Syria and is being implemented?

Abu Musa: Ever since our departure from Beirut until this moment, in my capacity as chief of military operations, I have said to Brother Yasir 'Arafat in all our military meetings that we must take action, any political action, to bring the views of the PLO and Syria closer together because this will reflect on our military forces and will enable us to play a role like any other power in Lebanon in any future battle. However, there has been no coordination [with the Syrians] from the time we left Beirut until this moment. This is due to the political relations between the Syrian and Palestinian leaderships--and Yasir 'Arafat has played a great role in destroying these relations.

Prior to the departure from Beirut 'Arafat made up his mind about his stand and decided that his direction will be Tunis and not embarking on a nationalist stand in the area. Therefore, we say that there was no coordination. We said that such coordination is necessary, but the brothers in the Palestinian leadership did not make any effort or hold any meeting to bring about such coordination.

Al-Lami: With regard to holding Yasir 'Arafat responsible for destroying relations with Syria, do you not believe that by saying this you are vindicating the Syrian stand?

Abu Musa: I believe that the claim that there was military coordination between Fatah and Syria and that such coordination was stabbed in the back is untrue. Such a claim holds Syria responsible for an action of which it is not guilty. It is Yasir 'Arafat who does not want coordination. In all our discussions and meetings he used to foment against the Syrian stand. He casts doubts on Syria's stand. I say this for the record, and not in defense of Syria.

Therefore, we say that Yasir 'Arafat has not made any effort to bring about coordination, and there was no coordination between us and the Syrian brothers.

Al-Lami: However, 'Arafat bases his claim on historical facts, including the events of 1976 and the well-known Syrian stand toward the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese National Movement. Some of us may find 'Arafat's sensibilities toward Syria justifiable.

Abu Musa: In 1976 it was not Yasir 'Arafat who opposed the Syrian stand in Lebanon. Yasir 'Arafat was outside Lebanon when the Syrian forces began to enter Lebanon under the slogan of rescuing the Palestinian resistance, and our view was that the Syrian action was not correct. We believed that the Syrian entry into Lebanon would affect the independence of the Palestinian decision and would perhaps affect our military position within the framework of the conflict in Lebanon. It was not 'Arafat who made the decision to confront because he was not in Lebanon. He was in Cairo. It is we who made the decision to confront. We made this decision on the basis of our analysis and our view that the Syrian stand conflicts with ours. We took this stand and we are the ones who oppose Yasir 'Arafat. It was us who took a stand opposing Syria in 1976. Now, when we see that Syria is calling for the rejection of the Reagan plan and the rejection of the confederation [with Jordan] plan and is advocating continued steadfastness in Lebanon and is opposing the Lebanese-Israeli agreement, we believe that these stands are positive and serve our Palestinian struggle. Therefore, we cannot but value these stands.

If Syria should retreat from these stands then Syria will have its course and we will have ours. If we suppose that Syria withdraws its forces from Lebanon, of what concern is this to me? Did we enter Lebanon under the protection of Syrian guns? We entered Lebanon under the protection of the Palestinian gun, and we fought in Lebanon with the Palestinian gun and national decision. Syria entered Lebanon in 1967, late and in a manner of which we did not approve. However, now I believe Syria's stands are positive, and I value them as long as they serve the Palestinian line and struggle. If Syria should retreat from its stand then never mind--I am here in Lebanon before Syria. Let the Syrian forces return, but I will remain in Lebanon and fight in the revolutionary way I adopted ever since the inception of the Palestinian revolution. I am judging the facts: there is a fact that has a positive effect on my stand. If this fact should change, then I would have a different stand.

Al-Lami: Following the military confrontation with the Syrian forces in Sidon, you were the target of an assassination attempt. Abu 'Ammar visited you in the hospital. Part of a report that circulated among a narrow circle and was leaked says in effect that you said to Abu 'Ammar: "The message has been received, Abu 'Ammar."

Abu Musa: I would like to go back a little. Twenty-one days before the assassination attempt Abu 'Ammar summoned me to Beirut. When I went to see him there was a group of people sitting. He said to me words to the effect: You must leave Lebanon. I said to him: For what reason should I leave Lebanon? He said: You must leave the country because your life could be in danger. I answered: I do not escape. When I fought I fought on behalf of the Palestinian people. I did not fight for a private cause. I fought with fighters and cadres who exist. What would my stand be if I leave this country for another place, under whatever name or slogan? This would mean that I am abandoning the fighters and cadres with whom I fought.

This took place while I was still standing. I was taken aback by this situation that took place before I sat down in front of the people who were present--who should not have heard this exchange. I went out and said to him: I am going to southern Lebanon and I am not returning to you. I stayed the whole period, about 21 days, without going to Beirut or meeting him. This was in 1976. On the day on which the assassination attempt took place I remember that he visited me in Sidon about 0205 in the morning. I said to him: "The matter is over." He said: "I told you to leave." I replied: "I do not escape." I believe in God's will, and it is not the right time to elaborate on this matter.

Al-Lami: We return to the topic with which we began the interview. The question is in two parts: Do you not believe that the Syrian decision [to expel 'Arafat] will have a negative effect on the Palestinian citizen who lives in Syria or Lebanon? The second part is: Wouldn't this decision push Abu 'Ammar toward the Arab governments that are well-known for their stands [not further elaborated], and consequently there will be a movement toward accepting the U.S. plans or making further concessions than those conceded at the Fes summit conference?

Abu Musa: The way I see it is that 'Arafat's expulsion will win sympathy for him from the persecuted and oppressed Palestinian people. Our people will champion their Palestinianism even though this may be on a wrong basis--in view of the Palestinian suffering and dispersal throughout the past 30-40 years. Therefore, 'Arafat will seek to exploit and make use of the expulsion on the popular level and on the level of the man-in-the-street. On the political level, we were aware that Yasir 'Arafat wants a justification, any justification, for this incident. As I have said in the beginning, we believed from the time we began our movement that 'Arafat would evade tackling the issue internally [within Fatah] and would take it to an Arab level, and specifically [we predicted that] he would move away from the arena of conflict and fighting [with Israel] and accuse Syria or create a problem with Syria, and this is what happened. As for moving away [from the arena of conflict] I believe that Yasir 'Arafat had already moved away and will not turn back. Does this mean that he will thus be achieving victories for the Palestinian people? No, he certainly will not be achieving victories or fulfilling genuine national causes. There is only an illusion before him put by certain well-known Arab governments.

Therefore, 'Arafat is always thinking of totally and openly turning to these people. We believe that it is possible that he will use this situation [expulsion from Syria] and turn specifically to Egypt--not to Jordan--because he believes that Egypt, and as a result of its relations with the United States, is capable of bringing him solutions to the national cause, whereas we believe

that there is no possibility of bringing about a patriotic [watani] solution through Husni Mubarak, King Husayn or the United States.

The only solution that is being put forward is the Reagan plan, which says no to a Palestinian state. Anything less than a Palestinian state is treason to the Palestinian cause. We want a Palestinian state not so that there will be 22 Arab states, but so that it will be the symbol of a conflict and the perpetuation of a conflict between the Arab nation and Zionism. The alternative to Israel is not Syria or Jordan. The alternative is to have on Palestinian territory an independent Palestinian state to continue the conflict with the Zionist entity until it ceases to exist. Yasir 'Arafat will not be able to establish such a state through the political action and methods he is carrying out. In my view such a state requires five wars in order to establish positive and tangible facts that will compel Israel and the United States to concede that a Palestinian state must exist. As for a confederation with the Jordanian regime without the establishment of a Palestinian state, this will be a process of annexing the Palestinian people--including those in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip--to the Jordanian regime and will subsequently lead to a Jordanian-Israeli control of the West Bank.

The Reagan plan, in fact, does not only entail the annexation of the West Bank by Jordan, but will also entail the annexation of Jordan to Israel because there will then be economic and other relations and open borders. All of this is in Israel's interest. Time will show that 'Arafat will take such steps, but his steps will not be legal. This is because he who departs from the Palestinian National Charter and the political program becomes outside the Palestinian struggle and consequently, all his moves will be illegal. He has already departed from such legality more than once and he should be divested of his legality now because he has done harm to many principles of the Palestinian National Charter.

Al-Lami: If this is how you view the policy of Brother Yasir 'Arafat, that is to work with the camps of which you spoke in order to achieve what he wants, you also have agreed to the Brezhnev plan, a plan that has not accepted anything opposed to the Zionist presence in Palestine.

Abu Musa: We only welcome the Brezhnev plan. Welcoming is one thing, and acceptance is another. Brezhnev is from the Soviet Union, and we welcome any plan that takes the Palestinian cause from one position to a better position. However, we reject the Fes plan because it is an Arab plan and there should not be an Arab plan that has a fixed ceiling like the ceiling of the Fes plan and that cannot be implemented. We object to it. As for the Reagan plan, what is in it? What does it say about the Palestinian cause? It says: No to the Palestinian state, no to the PLO. It says that the settlements should stay. What is left for us?

Al-Lami: The Brezhnev plan proposes a solution through the recognition of Israel's existence.

Abu Musa: Yes, but who says that we have adopted it and have begun to act on its basis. We have not agreed to it and we have not adopted it as the only plan for a solution.

Al-Lami: You agreed to it through the resolutions of the Palestine National Council in Cairo.

Abu Musa: The latest PNC session in Algiers said "no-yes" to the Reagan plan when it declared that the Reagan plan does not fulfill the aspirations of the Palestinian people and does not refer to the Palestinian state and therefore, it is rejected as a basis for a solution. This means that we have not rejected it. We rejected it as a basis, but it was viewed as a plan among several plans with which we can deal. This is a sin. It is not right. The PNC should have adopted a resolution rejecting the Reagan plan as long as it rejects the Palestinian state and the PLO.

Al-Lami: The official Arab structure is known to all of us. The overwhelming majority of the Arab governments are directly or implicitly moving toward reconciliation and recognition of Israel. There are no real signs, even by the nationalist governments, to mobilize the Arab people and fight a nationalist liberation war against Israel. Don't you think that your position in opposition to Brother Yasir 'Arafat is not accepted on the Arab level? You are insisting on positions that date back to the days of national renaissance. Are you dreaming or what?

Abu Musa: When we began our work in 1965 the Arab reality was the same. The regimes were backward, had no apparent military forces, and had not set up their liberation programs. Therefore, we saw that it is the duty of the Palestinian people to take the initiative and set up the correct program toward the liberation of Palestine. That is why during its uprising in 1965 Fatah said that the only way for the liberation of Palestine is armed struggle depending, in that, on the Palestinian and Arab masses. It did not say that the liberation of Palestine is the task of the Palestinian people alone. Fatah said that the liberation of Palestine is an Arab duty and that we as owners of land and dispersed people have to be the vanguard. We said that we call for a Palestinian revolution with an Arab depth and expansion depending on our Arab masses in mobilizing and arming this revolution and call for creating Arab positions or developing the Arab regimes so that they can confront the struggle and support the Palestinian revolution. But the question is: Has the Palestinian revolution relied on these programs, which are set up as principles and objectives? Has it not deviated from these political programs?

We see that the Fatah movement specifically has not practiced what it has written and has not practiced the programs and principles which it has set up. Fatah has deviated from these principles through establishing relations with the regimes and through neglecting the masses. It has not made contacts with these masses and depended in all its financial and political moves on the Arab regimes, especially on those well-known nonnationalist regimes. This led the revolution to the current situation. If we say that we are incapable

at this stage of liberating Palestine or part of it, does this force us to abandon and betray the Palestinian issue in light of this bad Arab reality? It is true that we are not able to liberate Palestine, but we must not give up. At the time when the Palestinian revolution imposed itself as a movement for the liberation of a nation and for the return of a people to their homeland, some people come after 18 years of this long struggle to propose political issues that are leading to abandoning the Palestinian issue and to the recognition of the Zionist entity as a legitimate existence in Palestine. This is not the course of the Palestinian revolution. It is much better for us to stop the revolution if necessary so that others can come and lead a new revolution.

It is absolutely unacceptable that we should undermine the Palestinian issue due to the fact that we are living in a bad Arab reality. When we began our movement there was also a bad Arab reality. Hence, why did we move and why did we create the revolution? That was for the liberation of Palestine. If we could not achieve the objectives of the revolution, others can complete the march, even after 100 years. It is not our right nor it is the right of anyone to relinquish one inch of the land of Palestine and no one has the right to recognize the Israeli presence.

Al-Lami: We return to the move which took place more than a month ago. Why did this move take place at this specific time? Was there any previous attempt that was postponed for one reason or another?

Abu Musa: There was not any previous attempt. We react to the political reality and to its impact on the issue. We have always been striving to find out solutions within the framework and dialogue until at last we reached a result that these frameworks and dialogue are useless. We found out that nobody is going to hear us and that nobody respects the frameworks or respects or hears an opinion. Therefore, we took this position.

We did not determine the timing of the move. It was Yasir 'Arafat who did that when he went to Amman and wrote the document which could have been a Palestinian-Jordanian working paper at the next dialogue. We saw how Yasir 'Arafat agreed on the paper. It is correct that he did not sign it, but he wrote it with King Husayn. The delay and postponement of the dialogue were not the action of Yasir 'Arafat, but were the action of the Executive Committee members and due to the general circumstances. Then Yasir 'Arafat came to Damascus and began to issue organizational and military decisions regarding the Lebanese arena through the symbols which he put on top of the pyramid of the military work. We say that is a political move and not an organizational operation. This means that the symbols put by 'Arafat on the top leadership in the Lebanese arena are symbols having a political view that represent a threat to our troops and to the continuation of the presence of our military forces in Lebanon.

We said that it is necessary to confront these decisions, because if we do not stand to prevent them on the spot, other decisions will follow to strike all the national forces inside the Fatah movement to keep them away from the Lebanese arena and hence, to dominate the troops for the purpose of pulling them out of Lebanon. From here we said that it is necessary to stand against

the first round of decisions. We made this decision because if we allow these decisions to pass, other decisions will follow. And if we come to declare this position, nobody is going to hear us because it will be too late.

Al-Lami: But the speech which you delivered at the meeting of the revolutionary council in Aden was considered as the beginning of the move and was described by Brother Yasir 'Arafat as being Colonel Abu Musa's first military communique. There are circles in the resistance which say that 'Arafat was aware of your move. Therefore, he issued these decisions to explode the issue so that your move becomes illegal.

Abu Musa: What is the legitimacy? It is the charter, it is the program. When one of us is elected he swears to God that he will abide by the constitution and when he violates this constitution he loses legitimacy. The legitimacy in the revolution is the legitimacy of the program and charter and as long as the leadership is adhering to the program and charter it keeps the legitimacy within its grasp. But when it violates the political program and National Charter, naturally, it is no longer legitimate. Therefore, it no longer represents the base, the armed struggle and the revolution. From here, it sounds correct that 'Arafat wants to get rid of all the patriots and honest people in the arena so that he can behave as he likes and according to his own wishes.

Yasir 'Arafat's individualism has gone too far. Accordingly, we see that he is escalating the situation. For this reason we say that we will not leave Fatah, nor will be separated from it. We are an indivisible part of it and we will remain in it. If Yasir 'Arafat wants to leave it forever, he will be doing that alone. By violating the program and charter, he loses the legitimacy and the legitimacy at the end is the legitimacy of the Palestinian rifle, not the legitimacy of a person. It is the legitimacy of an armed struggle.

Al-Lami: Abu Iyad [Salah Khalaf], whose views you know, says that during the first days the brother commander in chief sent to you 20 officers among those whom you know and trust, you rejected the principle of mediation and said: "Either accept what we say or no talks."

Abu Musa: These officers are among the nationalist officers inside the Fatah movement with whom we have been continuously talking politically about the deteriorating situation, both on the Fatah and Palestinian levels. These officers used to say: Who will ring the bell? It is time. We used to call on them not to be in a hurry because there was a hope of discussing the matters within the framework of the movement. 'Arafat sent those officers to play the mediation role in order to neutralize them because he knew that they were backing our move and to make it seem as if they are a different party. In spite of that, we received them every time they came to us, but there was no dialogue between us. They only warned us against abandoning our position. They warned us by saying: Do not abandon this position, because Yasir 'Arafat will not give anything, and if he gives anything he will retract from his position. Therefore, if you retreat 'Arafat will knock out all patriots in

the Fatah arena and will then do the same thing in the Palestinian arena. They came to us to declare their loyalty. Some of these officers even declared their clear position. We are now backing some of the officers who are only formally siding with 'Arafat. They also call on us not to abandon our position and they call on us to leave them in their positions so that they can explain things to those who still do not know what is happening. It is no secret to say that we are not alone in our sector. We have supporters among those who are working with 'Arafat and these are working day and night to reform those who have been deceived. Those are the officers who according to Abu Iyad played the mediation role and who we did not meet. We received them and they are not mediators. They will back our move until it achieves its positive objectives.

Al-Lami: Abu Iyad has said: I do not object at all to what the "young men" say. He also said that this is not the first time he has declared his view. He said: I am one of the strongest opponents of Yasir 'Arafat's line. I have always said that he makes decisions on his own and does not consult anyone and that he has totally ignored military action. Abu Iyad, however, objects to the timing [of Abu Musa's action], and said that it is inopportune because you are in Syria and not on your own territory. Abu Iyad said that this is a split. What does Col Abu Musa say, particularly in response to Abu Iyad's remarks?

Abu Musa: We say that this is not a split but a call for reform and a return to the roots, so that the Palestinian revolution will revert to its principles and goals. The Palestinian revolution must adhere to the political program and the Palestinian National Charter. We should not be criticized for the timing. It is not we who determined the timing. It was determined by Yasir 'Arafat when he made his organizational decisions [appointments of military commanders] which we viewed as an imminent political move on the Lebanese arena.

It is Abu 'Ammar who imposed the timing on us. It has also been said that the situation is critical and the outbreak of a war is possible. This is true. However, a failure to respond to 'Arafat's military organizational measures in the wake of the political stand adopted in Amman could have made our stand in a month's time meaningless and futile, and we would not have found anybody to stand by us because the armed Palestinian exodus from Lebanon would have begun and it would have been too late.

Therefore, we say that in response to this criticism, this is the right place for declaring such stands. Our men in the YAR have taken a stand and there was almost complete unanimity in support of our stand. They tried to contain this move. There were marches from the camp [in YAR where Palestinian fighters are stationed] to the airport and the marchers called for returning to Lebanon so that they can carry out their role in support of our movement. However, no report has been published about this in any newspaper. Our people even do not know that there are Palestinian fighters in the YAR who support our movement. Why? Because there is no such thing called correction in Yemen and another thing called correction in Sudan. The corrective process takes place in the land where the real conflict is taking place, and this is why we wanted our stand to be declared from Lebanon. The declaration of such a stand could

be meaningless even in Syria. The starting point should be from the land where the conflict is taking place, from Lebanon. It is, therefore, 'Arafat who has imposed the timing on us. The place is 100 percent correct.

We are not a secessionist movement, we are very much a unifying movement. We want to get rid of all the blemishes that taint the Palestinian revolution. We want to get rid of all the opportunists and hangers-on who have enriched themselves at the expense of the Palestinian revolution. Instead of giving to the revolution they sought to exploit it for their own personal interests. This is what disturbs many of our brothers in the Palestinian leadership. We want to get rid of those who want to find a justification for not shouldering their responsibility and support and rejection of our movement so that they can escape far away, because they have lost their feeling for continuing the struggle and because they have adapted themselves to the Arab reality and Arab regimes and become accustomed to traveling comfortably in planes and living luxuriously in palaces with servants at their disposal. They have been far removed from the bases of the revolution for a whole year--from September 1982 until now. Abu Iyad has entered Lebanon, the arena of the conflict, only once, and was content to stay in a palace in Tunisia and travel between Kuwait and Yugoslavia and conclude security agreements with Interpol. Ours is not the revolution that concludes agreements and treaties with imperialist countries such as France and others on the exchange of criminals and the pursuit of strugglers everywhere.

This is the counterrevolution; it is not a revolution. The revolution is that which protects strugglers. The revolutionary is not he who goes to ask for the release of 50 Americans in the American Embassy in Iran. The revolutionary is he who says to the Iranian revolution: Put these spies and CIA agents on trial, and not he who mediates to bring about their release. The situation has reached such a state. The revolution is not that I should meet with a group of Zionists who have no influence, not even in the Zionist state. The mere meeting with Zionists is more harmful to us than to Israel. We say to these leaders, return to the principles and programs. We ask them to return to the revolution and remember how it started, how it struggled, and how it triumphed. Thus we can struggle, fight, and triumph.

Al-Lami: Abu Iyad also said: We have Abu Hajim [whose appointment by 'Arafat Abu Musa opposed], Abu al-Za'im, and other elements. Similar elements have also joined Abu Musa's movement, and I fear that these people will ride the wave and consequently weaken the noble principles that inspired the movement.

Abu Musa: I do not believe that he is being precise. There is no one among our ranks who is similar to Abu Hajim and [his brother] Abu al-Za'im. There is no one of this kind at all in our movement. If he has names let him communicate them to us so that we can inform him whether he is right or wrong. It is not a question of self-criticism for the sake of improving the situation. If he is anxious for this movement let him come to me; let him come and declare his support for these demands and we are prepared to cooperate with him in the same way we are now cooperating with any other struggler within the movement for which we are fighting.

Al-Lami: Can we consider what you said as a message to Abu Iyad?

Abu Musa: He is welcomed on the condition that he adopts these positions and admits that the frameworks have become capable of remedying the issues under discussion. The democratic dialogue and dialogue inside the Central Committee and Revolutionary Council have all become useless, especially after the message which we presented to the meeting of the Revolutionary Council in Aden. As soon as I finished my speech the message was held and was not proposed for discussion. They promised that it will be discussed at the next session, which has not yet been scheduled. It is possible that the council has not convened until now and will not convene even after a month due to this case.

Al-Lami: After the last meeting of the Revolutionary Council in Damascus many things were clear. It seems that matters are moving toward military settlement. What do you expect in this regard?

Abu Musa: First, I consider that the Revolutionary Council has not convened. The meeting which was held was illegal because the quorum was incomplete and only 35 out of the 72 members of the council attended the meeting. Two-thirds of the members must attend the meeting in order for it to be legal. Therefore, all the decisions of the council are not based on law and are illegitimate.

Second, after receiving news of the al-Masna' incident, Yasir 'Arafat was seen showing a victory sign, which meant that he wanted to settle the matter militarily. 'Arafat made this decision before the meeting of the Revolutionary Council. Official spokesman Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman said in FILASTIN ATH-THAWRAH magazine: Commander in Chief Brother Yasir 'Arafat has decided to settle the matters militarily and he will supervise that by himself. This was exactly what was written in FILASTIN ATH-THAWRAH. They did form a force and tried to assault our positions in the village of Majdalun in the Ba'labakk area, but they failed, not because we fiercely fought against them, but because the force which was formed by 'Arafat was to be led by Abu Hajim [Ahmad 'Attalah], who they cannot trust as a leader for organizational and political reasons. Consequently, these elements back our position and believe in our demands. Therefore, Yasir 'Arafat failed to achieve any victory on the ground.

From here, we can say that it is Yasir 'Arafat who began the battle and the military liquidation decision. It is Yasir 'Arafat who made the decision, began to practice it and he will continue to practice it. But, will he be able to achieve a military victory? We confidently say no, depending on the Fatah base which believes in the democratic dialogue and believes in our demands and which is not convinced of Yasir 'Arafat's political practices. Therefore, this base will not be an easy tool with which to execute Yasir 'Arafat's military settlement decision. We also depend on our strength, belief and will for defending the objectives which we have proposed. Therefore, we will fiercely defend these objectives and we will die for them.

Al-Lami: You said: We will reply to the first, second and third bullets. But an incident took place in Damascus where your elements attacked a supply unit on the al-Yarmuk road, which resulted in the martyring of two persons.

Abu Musa: It can be an ammunition dump and not a camp. Our policy is not to carry out any military action against any position. The uprising that took place in the supply, procurement and transportation offices was a reaction to the leadership's stand when it halted fuel and other supplies. Even water was denied to us. The reaction to this in the positions was an internal uprising and the control of these camps. But we have not made any decision to attack or occupy any position because the issue is a political one and no one can be made to adopt a political stand with force if he is not convinced of how to struggle in defense of this principle. This is impossible. Yet, the incidents which took place in Damascus were a reaction to the leadership's stand of denying supplies.

Al-Lami: The political and military struggle is now clear and all state their views on the very near future. If the leadership continues to insist on its current stand and if media escalation continues, do you intend to proclaim an alternative for Fatah? In other words, do you intend to proclaim yourself as Fatah's legitimate leadership?

Abu Musa: We are anxious for Fatah's unity and we will continue to work for that. We are sincere in this and we will continue to keep Fatah united on the correct Palestinian stand. But if the leadership continues its policy and continues to shun facing facts, then we expect this leadership to come to an end. It is probable that Yasir 'Arafat will go and Fatah will continue in Sudan or in Tunisia. But the true Fatah is the combatting Fatah. It is Fatah which is fighting in Lebanon. There is no revolution in Sudan, Algeria or even in the PDRY. The true revolution is the one which survives with the gun in Lebanon. That is why we considered Yasir 'Arafat's decision to evacuate the gun from Lebanon a serious one. We strongly call on him to return the Palestinian gun from exile to Lebanon because the revolution exists on this land and there cannot be a revolution in Sudan.

We are also anxious for Fatah's unanimity and unity in Lebanon. If 'Arafat decides to leave, he will ultimately leave alone with a limited number of figures who have failed politically and in their conduct and who have no role among us. Therefore, he will leave with individuals and the revolution will not come to an end. It will survive because the revolution's authority is that of the gun.

Al-Lami: And what about the occupied territories?

Abu Musa: The occupied territories are the essence of our struggle. And this is a motivating factor wherever Israel is or wherever our hands can reach Israeli instruments.

Al-Lami: There are reports that Abu Jihad, who commands "the Western sector," has announced that he and his command are joining you. AL-KHALIJ publishes a report to that effect, quoting a Palestinian official in Kuwait. But now we see signs of support for the commander in chief [Yasir 'Arafat], and known Palestinian figures are sending cables of support to him as well.

Abu Musa: Our people are emotional. Like I said before about the Syrian decision, Yasir 'Arafat will win some public sympathy. This spontaneous sympathy is not based upon a political vision and facts, but when our people understand the situation they will be with the cause and not with a particular individual. Our people do not worship idols or individuals. Our people love Palestine and love our struggle against Israel. Therefore, these issues will become clear to them. Perhaps they [presumably pro-'Arafat elements] can now give a distorted picture of our present situation through the Western information media and through the big information instrument put at their disposal. However, the facts will eventually triumph and things will become clear to our people in the occupied territories. They will realize that the political course pursued by Yasir 'Arafat is not in their interest and what the sincere nationalists in the Palestinian arena as a whole and the Fatah arena in particular are calling for is that which is really in their interest.

Al-Lami: My next question might be a bit sensitive. Have you established contact with those inside [the occupied territories]?

Abu Musa: Yes, we have had contacts for a long time, and we have friends and an organization as well. Part of the "Western" [sector] is working with us. We have maintained contact since the beginning of this situation up to this very day. However, we have not called on our supporters to demonstrate in support of us like those who demonstrated in support of 'Arafat. Things will take place in due time.

Al-Lima: There has been some confusion about the operation that took place in the sector of "the September martyrs battalion." The Fatah command's statements and your statements are contradictory. Also the reports of Western information media and of a number of Arab sources were not objective, and this has concealed the true situation from many people. We would like you to tell us about what really happened, if possible.

Abu Musa: The September martyrs battalion was positioned in an area where Yasir 'Arafat and Khalil al-Wazir had and still have a presence and domination through the organs there, but not the forces; through the organs of the combined 17th, military security unit, unified security unit and information security unit, as well as through their security representatives. And as you know, they have created security organs out of the Fatah movement. People spied on each other and no one devoted himself entirely to fighting. Everything was a "security organ" which served their interests. The battalion was in an area infested with these organs. When the "youngmen" decided to adopt their stand--and they were the majority of those making up the battalion--they announced their stand clearly and frankly despite all the dangers surrounding them. We discussed the matter with them and told them they were going to be subjected to military operations and actions that might harm them. Despite this and out of their belief in the principles we presented, they refused to announce their stand unless they remained in that contaminated place. They refused to move to a safe position so that it would not be said that they had fled. Despite this,

we made our decision bearing in mind the perils to which the "young men" might be exposed. As soon as the group of "young men," the majority of the battalion, announced its stand, Yasir 'Arafat and Khalil al-Wazir called on each other and summoned all "organ elements" and made a decision to strike at the battalion's position. The fighting lasted from 1630 to 0200. I kept in constant touch with those "young men" while they were being besieged by Yasir 'Arafat's and Khalil al-Wazir's group. Then the Lebanese national movement interferred, because of the damage and casualties sustained by civilians, and appealed to us to ceasefire in order to alleviate the suffering of the civilians in the region. In response to this appeal and out of our love for the Lebanese people, who did not once hesitate to sacrifice their blood, houses, and whatever we needed for the cause, we decided to transfer those "young men" to safe positions within our area. We brought them around 0400 in the morning in order to avoid further bloodshed and damage inflicted on civilians. This is what happened in the September martyrs battalion which rebelled and declared its stand of one in support of our stand.

Al Lami: This is on Fatah's level. But on the level of other factions, we know that there have been contacts with you in order to reach a solution that does not harm the Palestinian revolution and the Palestinian resistance in general. We heard that you have not been positive with them.

Abu Musa: The question is not being positive or negative. The question is that we cannot accept middle solutions for what we have demanded, whether for these problems or against them. There can be no middle solutions under a leadership such as that of Yasir 'Arafat considering what we know of his retreat and withdraw stands and even his attitude of turning his back on many problems. Thus, there can be no middle solution.

If these questions are just they must say so or say that they are not. But it is not right on their part to play the role of mediator as if the problem does not concern them or as if they live in Africa or in Japan if they intend to reconcile two parties. This is not permissible for organizations such as the PFLP and the DFLP, although we know and we are sure that the comrades in the DFLP will never support our stand. But the fact is that we view the PFLP differently.

Therefore, we say no mediation and no middle solutions. Therefore, these comrades should stick to these principles and not to take a neutral role or stand as spectators. If they want to support 'Arafat, it is up to them. We don't encourage them but we don't imagine that matters will reach this stage. Thus, we have rejected the mediation because these are political problems. They are related to the national question and thus, there can be no middle solution to them.

We oppose the process of concessions and settlements. We do understand how Palestine can be liberated and this is not possible except through armed struggle. Palestine will not come back through the Brezhnev plan nor through the Reagan plan nor through the confederation. We feel that the PFLP must improve its stands to favor our side. As for the DFLP, we don't hope that this will happen on the basis of our long experience with the comrades in the DFLP, because they have a high degree of fluctuation between stands. Therefore, we don't place great hopes in the DFLP, but we do rely on the PFLP.

Al-Lami: So long as we are talking about mediation, there has been a PRDY role and that of the Soviet delegate who arrived in Damascus recently and there is today the statement by 'Arafat in which he said that the Soviets want the PLO to be intact and to have good relations with Syria. Have the Soviets been moving more effectively in order to present good efforts to resolve their dispute?

Abu Musa: I personally have not felt an extra Soviet move. However, I am sure that the Soviets and others whom you have mentioned do support the Palestinian question as a national question. They support the PLO and want it to be united. We are with the PLO too and want it to be united. So who is the one that acts against the PLO? Who is the one that wants to divide the PLO? Not us, but Yasir 'Arafat.

Is he, as a person, the representative of the Palestinian people or is it the PLO that is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people? This absolute autocracy is almost like the autocracy of kaisers and emperors. He says: "I am the Palestinian decision," but he is not the Palestinian decision. The group is the decision, the programs are the decision, and the charter is the decision.

Al-Lami: Sorry to ask this question, but Abu Jihad and Abu 'Ammar have been mentioned several times by you. Is there anything personal between you and them?

Abu Musa: There has never been any personal dispute between me and Yasir 'Arafat or Khalil al-Wazir, but those two are the ones who practice, plan, and lead, and what remains of the Central Committee is nothing. Actually, we have no Central Committee in Fatah. Who acts in the Central Committee? These others eat and drink. They drive cars, have money and go on holidays for refreshment. Abu Mazin [Mahmud 'Abbas] obtained a PhD degree in Zionism. He has been warming on Zionism and meeting with the Zionists. This is the Central Committee and the rest have nothing to do with what is going on.

Therefore, I frequently mention their names because they are the two persons who act and lead and they are the ones who do harm and damage Fatah, its forces, organizations and positions.

Al-Lami: There is an analysis that if Abu 'Ammar abandons Abu Jihad, matters can be solved.

Abu Musa: Abu 'Ammar is the first, the second, the third, the fourth, and the fifth, and then comes Abu Jihad. In Fatah there is no Abu Jihad without Abu 'Ammar, but there is Abu 'Ammar without Abu Jihad.

Abu Jihad lives and survives under Abu 'Ammar's umbrella. If Abu 'Ammar's umbrella is removed, there will be no Abu Jihad. Abu Jihad has a shop of his own, but he does not lead a movement. Both of them complement each other in political and military actions.

Al-Lami: But you said in the fourth general congress that Martr Majid Abu Sharar and his group supported Abu 'Ammar and strengthened his military and political position. Some people who are concerned about the Palestinian political work say that if it were not for such support Abu Jihad would have dominated all Fatah.

Abu Musa: The fact is not like that. It is not Abu Jihad who wanted to get rid of Abu 'Ammar. The fact is that all wanted to get rid of Abu 'Ammar and all attacked Abu 'Ammar because he has made too many mistakes. He even selects those who escort him by his own way. This is his nature. He can only live in an unclear environment. Therefore, he was rejected for these simple reasons. During the fourth congress we formed a seven-member committee. Everyone in the Central Committee said we want this and that person and all the members agreed. But when 'Arafat said he wanted that person, no one in the congress agreed, because he selected someone who was nothing and who has not the right to enter the congress.

That is why all the members criticized Abu 'Ammar at the congress. At the time we were hoping that 'Arafat, as a leader of the Palestinian revolution, would abandon this political course and the behavior and style which he has been pursuing for almost 5 years. But regrettably, when we reelected him he insisted on continuing this course. He did not retreat. We were even hoping that after the exit from Beirut he would change his style, but he showed more insistence on this political course, which represents a great loss to the Palestinian people and the Palestinian issue.

Al-Lami: There is whispering among progressive Palestinian circles and among a number of the Lebanese national movement circles that the transfers of some of the leaders are made through closed Phalangist areas. Is this true?

Abu Musa: They move to Ba'labakh and Tripoli through the road which passes through the village of Bushra. This road is very dangerous because there are many Phalangists. In spite of that, they have been going through this road every day since they came to the Lebanese lands after our move.

When did they come to Lebanon? Abu 'Ammar refused to return to Lebanon more than a year ago. He returned to Lebanon only after the move which we announced. We used to say to him: Brother Abu 'Ammar, when you visit Damascus, just come to Lebanon to raise the morale of the fighters. They have problems which you have to hear about. He used to answer: Brothers, I have a U.S. warning that the camps will be bombarded if I enter Lebanon. What do you think about a leader of a revolution who is forbidden by a U.S. warning from entering the land of the revolution?

Well, we believe that Lebanon is the land of the revolution and that this U.S. warning should not be accepted at all. Where was the U.S. warning when the uprising took place? Hence, either the man is lying and there is no U.S. warning or there is a U.S. warning and the Americans allowed him to enter Lebanon to end our move. In this case, the U.S. permission would only mean that our move is correct and that he is serving the Americans who are worried about our move and want something done to sabotage the march of the peaceful settlement and the proposed U.S. political settlement.

Al-Lami: According to a report conveyed to us by one of the members of the Supreme Military Council of the Palestinian revolution which was affirmed by Brigadier Abu al-Mu'tasim, the brother commander in chief of the Palestinian revolution forces offered some million dollars to the Islamic organizations in Tripoli. Can you confirm this report?

Abu Musa: I do not have documents or proof in this regard. The reports which come to us say that the leadership established relations with the Muslim brothers in Lebanon and offered a lot of financial assistance to them. Other reports say that Yasir 'Arafat spent about 26 million Lebanese liras in Lebanon during the past 45 days and that he distributed this amount of money in the form of gifts to certain groups for the purpose of winning the support of these groups.

Al-Lami: Are there any new developments with regard to the assassination of Brigadier General Abu al-Walid [Sa'd Sayil]? Did the revolution not discover the perpetrators? Has it become a "perfect crime" where no details are known about it?

Abu Musa: By merely following up the issue of Abu al-Walid, we come to an immediate conclusion on how Abu al-Walid was killed. After Abu al-Walid was shot and after his martyrdom was announced, a "local investigation committee" was formed under the chairmanship of a lieutenant colonel who works with "military security," which is led by Abu al-Za'im. Abu al-Walid was the guest of Abu Hajim [Ahmad 'Attalah], the brother of Abu al-Za'im. The place where Abu al-Walid was killed is just 4 kilometers away from the place where he had dined. Abu al-Walid left the place without being accompanied by any of those who hosted him, although he was usually accompanied by his hosts to "al-Masna'" where he stayed while in Lebanon. The mere formation of such a low-level investigation committee implies that this is routine incident. Neither the director of national security, "Abu Iyad," nor the official in charge of central security, "Abu al-Hawl" [Hayid 'abd al-Hamid] arrived in the place where the crime was committed in order to unveil the details of the crime and to announce the details of the crime to the Palestinian and Arab peoples.

I regard this behavior as vivid evidence to obliterate the issue of the martyrdom of Abu al-Walid. What happened was that after the elapse of 1 week this matter was no longer discussed. If the "Abu al-Walid" issue were genuine, if it interested us as a Palestinian revolution, and if the leadership was interested in knowing who perpetrated it, then the members of the Central Committee would have had to undertake the investigation. But appointing an officer with the army rank of lieutenant general who works under the supervision of "Abu al-Za'im," who is incapable of recalling "Abu Hajim" or of asking him a simple question, and who has no authority to recall him, implies that there was no serious intention to unveil the issue of the assassination of "Abu al-Walid."

Al-Lami: Do we understand that you want to reopen the "file" of the assassination of Abu al-Walid?

Abu Musa: I wish that this file [would] be opened. But who will open this file? Will they undertake this responsibility? No, I do not think that they will. but if they did, then they could make charges against anyone they desire. That is why there should be a neutral investigation.

Al-Lami: Could this very "neutral investigation" be attributed to the Lebanese National Movement since the incident took place on Lebanese territory?

Abu Musa: Under the current circumstances, the Lebanese National Movement is not entitled to play this role. But if the situation within Fatah is ameliorated and the current situation comes to an end, then many matters will be clarified with regard to the martyrdom of "Abu al-Walid."

Al-Lami: How was Abu al-Walid in his last days?

Abu Musa: Abu al-Walid left Beirut extremely disappointed at the way in which the dialogue was held with Philip [Habib] through Sa'ib Salam. He was also disappointed at the way of departing Beirut. He used to threaten that measures would be taken and trials would be held against those who fled the battlefield during the war. Therefore, Abu al-Walid was targeted so he would not be a thorn drawn sword or a means to pressure the leadership in the direction of ensuring reformation, in making a careful evaluation of the battle, and in trying all those who fled the battlefield.

Al Lami: Did Abu al-Walid mention these stances in official meetings?

Abu Musa: No. These views were just mentioned in private conversations with me. When he returned to Lebanon he applied pressure for the formation of an investigation committee. This committee, which was chaired by him, had not yet finished gathering information about the Lebanon war. He held about four investigation meetings with al-Haj Isma'il and the command of al-Haj Isma'il. He was martyred before the completion of the investigation.

Abu al-Walid chaired this committee in order to learn positive and negative aspects. The investigation committee has not so far completed its work because Abu al-Walid is absent. I do not think that this committee will complete its mission under the current leadership, which does not want to bring to account those who did not perform well in the war.

CSO: 4400/447

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

BUDGET FOR 1983--Al-Shariqah, 25 Jul (QNA)--Today's issue of AL-KHALIJ noted that the general budget of the UAE for this year is estimated at 14 billion dirhams. The paper added that a final review of the budget was undertaken yesterday at the Finance and Industry Ministry in order to have the budget proclaimed. It is noteworthy that last year's budget exceeded 22 billion dirhams. In other words, the current budget which was supposed to be proclaimed in January is 40 percent less than this year's budget. This can be attributed to the reduction in the oil revenues. [Text] [Doha QNA in Arabic 0810 GMT 25 Jul 83]

CSO: 4400/437

AFGHAN-PAKISTAN TALKS CALLED POSITIVE STEP

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 2 Jul 83 p 1

[Text]

KABUL, July 2 (Bakhshir).— Shah Mohammad Dost, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRA, presented a detailed report on Thursday to the Council of Ministers of the DRA on the results of the talks between the Afghan and Pakistani delegations in Geneva through the intermediary of Diego Cordovez, the representative of UN General Secretary. Shah Mohammad Dost said that in the first part of the second round of talks between the representatives of the DRA and Pakistan which took place from April 11 to April 22, 1983 in Geneva, an understanding was reached to recommence the talks in the Middle of June.

Thus, in the second part of these talks which took place from June 16 to

June 24 in Geneva, relevant questions were discussed and especially the issue of the cessation of intervention against the DRA was discussed in greater detail.

The representative delegation of the DRA, proceeding from the principles of the foreign policy of the DRA made great endeavour to secure greater understanding between the sides on issues which were the subject of the discussion.

Shah Mohammad Dost said that in the event of the other side showing necessary realism and goodwill on its part, there are hopes that the mission of the representative of the UN General Secretary would culminate in future in direct talks taking place between the sides. On the whole it can be said, added Dost, that

this round of talks had positive aspects and was another step forward.

The Foreign Minister of the DRA said that at the end of the talks the Afghan side expressed the desire of the government of the DRA for the continuation of constructive talks aimed at arriving at a political solution of the existing problems. Finally it was decided, continued Dost, that in order to continue the process of the talks and to establish further contacts with the concerned authorities of the countries concerned, the representative of the UN General Secretary should visit Kabul, Islamabad and Teheran in the near future so that greater understanding may be achieved for another future round of talks.

CSO: 4600/783

AFGHANISTAN

NVOI CLAIMS IRAN IS HOSTILE TOWARD DRA

GF241412 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Azeri 1745 GMT 10 Jul 83

[Unattributed commentary: "Democratic Afghanistan"]

[Text] Dear listeners, the third phase of the indirect talks in Geneva between the representatives of the DRA and Pakistan has ended. The foreign minister of Pakistan has said in connection with the matter that notable progress has been achieved during the talks in the direction of finding a political solution to the question. In his report to the Council of Ministers, the foreign minister of Afghanistan also stressed this point.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Shah Mohammad-Dost said that during the talks particular emphasis was placed on terminating interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. He stressed that it could be said in general, positive aspects have been observed during the current phase of the talks and it is possible to describe this as progress.

It was agreed at the end of the said phase of the talks that the special representative of the UN secretary general should visit Kabul, Islamabad and Tehran in the near future with a view to securing further mutual (?understanding). The outcome of the talks between the representatives of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the partial progress achieved should be considered within the framework of the world situation. However, uneasy about this and objecting to it is the warmongering stand of the United States. What is intolerable is the general stand of the Islamic regime in Iran toward Afghanistan and the fact that Iran's representatives are not taking part in the talks.

It is common knowledge that the Islamic regime in Iran refrained from participating in the talks on the pretext that the representatives of the Islamic organizations of fugitive Afghan counterrevolutionaries—that is to say the rejected Afghan feudals, khans, and sardars [tribal chiefs] and capitalists—were not participating in them. The Iranian regime is way ahead in hostility to the revolution of the Afghan nation; in fact it has even left the United States behind in that respect. What is the reason for this?

The reply to this question should first be sought in the following: Substantial reforms have been carried out in Democratic Afghanistan after the victory of the populist and anti-imperialist revolution in every domain in the economic, social and cultural fields, as well as in health services, in favor of the toil-

toiling people and the Muslims. The essence of this may be taken as a major source of inspiration by the struggling people of a number of countries whose leaders are making attractive promises. From this point of view, our country is an example. In fact, a brief comparison confirms the correctness of our view.

Regardless of all difficulties, foreign interference and the undeclared war waged by the United States, a democratic land reform is being put into effect in Democratic Afghanistan. And, land is being handed over to the toiling farmers--that is to say to those who work on it. However, why is it that land reform has not been carried out in Iran over 4 years after the victory of the revolution? Why has there been refrainment in the distribution of the land belonging to the major land lords and leading figureheads of the former regime? Why has there been refrainment in the distribution of (?arid) land regardless of the fact that the revolution council has approved this?

Ask the farmers to see that the land distributed to farmers on the basis of the land reform law approved by the revolution council during the initial stages of the revolution and through the effort made by the 7-member committees is being taken back from the farmers and given to the feudals. In Democratic Afghanistan however, the land and property belonging to the social plunderers, who have fled from the vengeance of the nation and who are currently engaged abroad in hatching plots against the Muslim Afghan people, have been nationalized and placed into the service of the people. In Iran however, thanks to the conspiracy of the rightists and the clergy, even the nationalized factories--including the establishment belonging to fugitive capitalists and managers--are being transferred [words indistinct] to their owners or to other billionaires under the pretext that the state is not a successful business manager. Thus, they are turning back to Iran in (?security). And, the seized property of the fugitive lords and pro-shah and counterrevolutionary officials is being returned to them.

The workers in Afghanistan have the right to enjoy security and [words indistinct], benefitting from [word indistinct] and justice. Regrettably however, there isn't a trace of this in Iran. The Ariamehri Labor Law is dominating the fate of the workers and the antiworkers labor law drawn up by Mr Tavakoli and his accomplices has paled the faces of even the Ariamehri officials.

Regrettably, during the past 2 years, the people of our homeland have received nothing else from the figureheads of the Islamic regime but (?unreal) promises. Lawlessness and the effort made to (?belittle) the objectives and slogans of the revolution are continuing. It is this revolutionary difference in Democratic Afghanistan which is making the leaders of the Islamic regime in Iran indignant toward the DRA.

CSO: 831/15

MECHANIZED STATIONS HELPING INDIVIDUAL FARMERS

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 5 Jul 83 p 3

[Text]

The activity of the mechanised stations covered 41000 hectares of land of the individual farmers, cooperatives and state farms in the course of the preceding year.

A source of the mechanised station in an interview with Kabul New Times said: "The general department of mechanised stations in line with the lofty objectives of the party and the state of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was established within the framework of the Agriculture and Land Reforms Ministry in 1359 (1980). The main purposes behind its establishment are expansion of the mechanised system, transformation of the traditional methods of agriculture into modern methods, saving time and finally raising the living standard of farmers as a whole."

The department was able to establish such stations in the five provinces of Balkh, Baghlan, Jauzjan, Kabul and Herat.

The stations are mobilis-

ed with modern agricultural equipments and machinery from the credit extended by the Soviet Union. Various tractors along with their supplementary and spare parts such as ploughs, harrrows, cultivators, combiners, seeders, seed-cleaning machines, fertilisers application machines, ditches, levellers, trucks, buses, mobile technical workshops, forclift, cranes, excavators and others are stationed in these mechanised stations, and at a very low cost are put at the disposal of the state farms, cooperatives and individual farmers.

In the course of last year altogether the activity of the mechanised stations has covered an area of 41000 hectares of land belonging to the state farms, cooperatives and individuals farmers.

Activities undertaken by the stations in the provinces of Jauzjan, Kabul and Baghlan are carried out more than target set in the plan.

Moreover, the stations carried out maintenance work of the equipments and ag-

gricultural machineries owned by the state farms, co-operatives and individual farmers.

The incomes earned from the activities of the stations are expected to arise by passing of each year. For instance, income recorded for last year is amounted to 17.6 million Afghanis and was transferred to the state revenue.

The source added: Since the department is newly set up, the mechanised stations acquire experience with every passing day.

To further encourage mechanisation in the country the stations have accepted to pay for the cost of the transporting of equipments and machineries to the lands of the farmers and state farms.

The general department of mechanised stations has close link with a Soviet company, Salkhozpromexport through economic consulate of the Soviet Union Embassy in Kabul and procures its needed equipment and machineries by a separate contract concluded in this context.

Moreover, some Soviet experts also cooperate with the stations in their activation and maintenance.

"All machineries", he went on to say are always placed at the service of toiling peasants. Various machineries in the Kabul, Jaujan and Baghlan stations have carried out different jobs like ploughing, cultivating, narrowing levelling and harvesting.

As all we know, prior to the victory of the Saur Revolution nothing was done adequately to promote mechanisation of agriculture, and only individual farmers and some of the institutions were able to bring such equipment to the country.

Fortunately, after the victory of the Saur Revolution, our revolutionary government, in order to strengthen the economic position of the farmers in the country, undertook land democratic reforms and consequently put an end to exploitation of man by man in our country. The state of affairs has changed the unjust feudal and prefeudal relations. Side by side with other transformations much efforts were made to boost efficiency in agriculture. Th-

us, attention was paid to the familiarisation of the farmers with the new technologies. This required setting up of the mechanised stations in the country".

Shedding light on the future plans and programmes of the department, the source said.

"According to the development plans of the country such stations would be opened in all provinces with modern equipment and machineries. It is our hope to serve better our toiling compatriots."

Answering another question, the source said: The number of the professional personnel of the department, in the centre and provinces, reach over 530. They are engineers, tractormen, combiners, mechanics, drivers and others.

For their further studies and experiences training courses are conducted now and again so as they could acquaint themselves with the operation of various machineries.

CSO: 4600/782

STRAINED RELATIONS WITH SAUDIS OVER PILGRIMAGE

Rafsanjani 'Warns' Saudis

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 22 Jul 83 p 2

[Text] The Majlis held an open session this morning headed by Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani. In this session, after the recitation of several verses from the Koran and before the agenda began, Messers Latif Safari, the representative of the people of Eslamabad-e Gharb; Mohammad Taqi Ranjbar, the representative of the people of Sowma'ehsara; and 'Ali Akbar Hamidzadeh, the representative of the people of Tavoj and Bu'inzahra, spoke. Then the speaker of the Majlis spoke regarding the recent actions of the combatants of Islam on the fronts of Kurdistan, Western Azarbaijan and northern Iraq:

In the name of God the compassionate and the merciful. The honorable representatives of our Muslim people know that our dear combatants on the fronts of Kurdistan, Western Azarbaijan and northern Iraq are engaged these days in one of the most critical movements during this time of war. It has been nearly four years that the two Provinces of Kurdistan and Western Azarbaijan have burned in the conspiracy and chaos of counterrevolutionaries and the people of these two provinces have no rest or tranquility. Every day they sacrifice a number of martyrs and wounded.

The main source feeding the counterrevolution is within the borders of Iraq, especially the bases around Piranshahr and other places. Today, the decision of the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Guards Corps and the timely action of Hamzeh Seyyed o-Shshohada base has provided these two provinces with relative peace and since two days ago, they have taken important counterrevolutionary bases from Iraq. Significant stores of ammunition which were all to be used in Iran have come into the hands of our forces. Fortunately, the operations indicate that we can hope to complete them.

What has become even more clear for us than in the past is the official and open cooperation of all the counterrevolutionary,

monarchist, hypocrite, communist, democrat, Kumeleh, Talebani and Zionist Iraqi movements. They have all participated together in this war and, fortunately, they have all been suppressed in this battle. It has been reported from Western Azarbajian that the people have welcomed this victory enthusiastically and have put all their resources at the disposal of the forces. We hope that in the near future our beloved combatants will be able to rescue the Provinces of Kurdistan and Western Azarbajian from the evil counterrevolutionary and Ba'thist elements. Another issue with which you are familiar is the fact that Saudi Arabia has created problems in regard to the pilgrimages of Iranian Muslim pilgrims. We warn the rulers of Saudi Arabia to stop creating these obstacles and not to force us to engage in actions which we do not wish to engage in and to expose things that we must to the Islamic nations. They should note themselves that the sacred Kaaba and the two noble shrines belong to all Muslims and that depriving 100,000 Iranian pilgrims from making their pilgrimage will have very bad consequences. We ask the religious scholars of the Islamic world to pay heed to this danger; preventing pilgrimages and the closure of the holy mosque cannot be tolerated by the Islamic world.

According to a report by the parliamentary correspondent of ETTELA'AT, after the speech of the speaker of the Majlis and the reading of the reminders by the representatives addressed to the executive authorities of the country, the Majlis went into session and continued its assessment of the report of the health committee on the bill concerning the duties and responsibilities of the Red Crescent society which had begun in the previous session. After statements for and against as well as the explanations of the parliamentary deputy of the Ministry of Health, votes were taken and the bill was ratified.

Also in this session, the appointment of three attorneys as members of the Council of Guardians of the Constitution was voted on and Messers

1. Khosrow Bzhani, son of 'Abdoljavad, the director general of the arbitration courts of Tehran, with 137 votes;
2. Hasan Fakheri, son of Mohammad Taqi, the first deputy of the prosecutor general, with 106 votes; and
3. Seyyed Jalal Madani-Kermani, son of Jamaloddin, director general of Islamic Republic Justice Department training, with 73 votes,

were chosen as the new members of the Council of Guardians.

Also, in continuing the session, the report on the first round of discussions of the health and economic affairs and finance

committees regarding the bill concerning the amendment providing the cost of quarantine services for the country, and the report of the first round of discussions regarding the bill adding two notes, Notes 1 and 2, to Article 21 of the law regulating medical and medicinal affairs in regards to the proposal for providing for women with no guardians were discussed and ratified. The details of today's discussions in the Majlis will be published in the next issue, on Saturday.

Ministry of Guidance Issues Communique

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 22 Jul 83 p 15

[Text] Following the visit of the delegation from the Islamic Republic to Saudi Arabia, it was announced yesterday that the dependent regime of Saudi Arabia has ignored the requests of the Iranian delegation and has demonstrated in practice its animosity towards the Muslim people of Iran.

The delegation, which had gone to Saudi Arabia from the Islamic Republic of Iran under the supervision of the deputy for international affairs of [the Ministry of] Islamic Guidance to express the positions and views of the Islamic Republic of Iran, returned to Tehran yesterday afternoon and in a communique issued at Mehrabad Airport, announced the results of this trip.

The text of this communique, made available to us by the public relations office of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, is as follows: In the name of the Almighty. In the wake of the various obstacles posed by the authorities of the government of Saudi Arabia to preparing for about 95,000 honorable Iranian pilgrims to make the pilgrimage to the Sacred House and the frequent warnings of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the government of Saudi Arabia in this regard, recently, a delegation headed by the deputy for international affairs of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance and representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the organization for hajj and pilgrimage departed for Saudi Arabia to express the views and positions of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning these problems in hopes of resolving them.

In a meeting between this delegation and the acting hajj and religious endowment minister as well as the minister of interior of Saudi Arabia, the Iranian delegation expressed and announced its dissatisfaction with the treatment thus far received in Saudi Arabia by the Iranian group for preparations and housing as well as the obstacles created regarding preparations and housing for the trip of the number of people requested by the Islamic Republic of Iran, stating that such treatment is considered an obstacle by the government of Saudi Arabia to the pilgrimage of

the Iranian pilgrims to that country and an expression of its animosity towards the revolutionary Muslim nation of Iran.

Then, the proposals of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Saudi Arabian authorities concerning the elimination of the problems were offered and the delegation pointed out that the rejection of these suggestions would negate the possibility of providing for the stay of Iranian pilgrims in Saudi Arabia.

The delegation announced that it would wait 24 hours for a response and that a negative response or the failure to respond to the proposals would be considered an added obstacle to those already created.

Most unfortunately, the government of Saudi Arabia, despite its duty to the pilgrims of the Sacred House, opposed the above-mentioned requests, which were for nothing more than the necessary resources for this sacred pilgrimage. The Iranian delegation concluded its visit and returned to the Islamic country of Iran.

In reporting the affair to the noble Muslim nation of Iran, we hereby declare our utmost dissatisfaction with and protest against this inappropriate action of the government of Saudi Arabia and ask Almighty God for the greatness of Iran, the honor of Muslims and the elimination of the enemies of Islam and Muslims.

10,000
CSO: 4640/299

IRAN

CONSTITUTION APPROVED AT FIRST IRP CONGRESS

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 21 Jul 83 p 15

[Text] Following the convening of the first session of the Congress of the Islamic Republican Party, there have been many requests for the publication of the preamble and constitution that were enacted by this congress. In answer to these requests, the texts of the preamble and constitution enacted by the first Congress of the Islamic Republican Party are presented for your consideration below.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

The party's aims are to perpetuate the Islamic Revolution for the Muslim people of Iran, and to strive to establish a just Islamic government throughout the world under the leadership of the chief theologian in the spiritual, cultural, economic, political, and military areas.

These efforts will necessarily entail the following measures:

1 - Raising the Islamic and political consciousness of the people, and expediting their revolutionary self-development in all areas.

2 - Cleansing the country of the legacies of despotism, colonialism, and exploitation, and a persistent campaign against all their agents and their intellectual and material trappings.

3 - The defense of value-generating human freedoms, which is a necessary condition for the blossoming of the nation's talents and capabilities in order to fulfill the Creator's plan for the achievement of their social destiny.

4 - Striving to create or expand a sound administrative system in which faith, sincerity, and worthiness are the criteria upheld in every occupation, and which keeps an interest in the work and a sense of responsibility alive in the employees.

5 - The continuation of efforts to end the economic domination of outsiders, and to prevent the plundering and wasting of the country's natural resources and manpower through the creation of independent, organized industry and agriculture, in which natural resources and manpower are used in the national interest and for procuring the needs of the public, while taking regional conditions into account.

6 - The uprooting of poverty and deprivation through the affirmation of the value of labor and the rejection of every form of exploitation; the establishment of a 100-percent Islamic economic system in accordance with the constitution, under which no person is obligated to sell his labor for less than its true economic value, under which the return for the labor of farmers, workers, and all laborers goes entirely to the laborers themselves, and under which the spiritual and human character of every individual is strengthened, and an inner longing is brought about in him to increase his efficiency and skill and to assist with the country's technical self-sufficiency.

7 - The expeditious uprooting of the remnants of the colonialist educational and administrative system and the full establishment of a genuine and independent system which can provide sufficient resources for the proper and fruitful training and education of all children and young people, uproot ignorance and illiteracy in all classes and all parts of the country, and guide our vast labor force to true spiritual, social, scientific, industrial, and agricultural progress through reliance on Islamic moral, social, and educational principles.

8 - Instilling Islamic values as much as possible in the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran so that they will be able to fulfill their true role more than ever in order to bring about domestic security, defend the country's borders, and protect all the nation's lands and rights against foreign aggression.

9 - The maximum possible strengthening of Islamic revolutionary organizations, be they military, police, judicial, economic, social, cultural, or developmental, and whole-hearted cooperation with them for the purpose of attaining the goals of the splendid Islamic revolution.

10 - Uprooting the remnants of the corruption, debauchery, sin, and materialism which are left over from the idolatrous, colonialist culture, relentless campaigning against every kind of polytheistic tendency, creating a suitable environment for the growth of spiritual values in society and the blossoming of the talents of the younger generation in the areas of ethics, art, science, and technology.

11 - The strengthening of foreign policy on the basis of the two Islamic principles of friendship and immunity, with the following results:

A - Full observance of the country's political, economic, cultural, and military independence without affiliation or leaning either to the Western or the Eastern bloc.

B - Respecting the independence and freedoms of other nations.

J - Expansion and strengthening of brotherly relations with all the Muslims of the world in cultural, economic, political, and military areas.

D - Maintaining friendly political, economic, and cultural ties with nations and governments who do not seek to dominate other nations or to attack and undermine the Muslim world.

H - Assisting the deprived and oppressed of the world and providing comprehensive support for nations that struggle for truth, justice, and freedom.

V - Combatting world unbelief, imperialism, racism, international Zionism and its supporters, and liberating Islamic lands, especially Palestine and Afghanistan.

Party Operating Principles

1 - Stressing the perpetuation and expansion of the Islamic revolution, and putting a stop to all forms of petrification, inactivity, and stagnation, which, based on historical experience, will automatically lead to reaction and deviation.

2 - Requiring ever-increasing solidarity with all combatant Muslim forces who believe in the vice-regency of the chief theologian, who are struggling against despotism, imperialism, and exploitation to establish an Islamic system of truth and justice, and preventing the appearance of obstacles to the expansion of creative struggle and effort in any particular group or class.

3 - Avoiding any form of affiliation or leaning towards groups and forces if alignment with them would damage the independence and Islamic priority of the revolution.

4 - Employing all combative and creative methods which are compatible with Islamic criteria, making full use of the most recent combative and constructive experiences of human societies, and doing what is required at every stage of the evolution of our society's Islamic revolution.

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CSO:4640/301

IRAN

SAUDIS BLAMED FOR CREATING 'IGNOMINY' IN WASHINGTON MOSQUE

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 17 Jul 83 p 3

[Text] Again this week the fascist American police prevented Muslim revolutionary brothers and sisters from attending the mosque in the city of Washington, but the diplomats and employees of the reactionary Arab regimes, with the protection of the American police and under the leadership of a clerical pretender from the Saudi Court, held what passed for Friday prayer services in the glare of the flash bulbs of foreign reporters.

According to a report from Washington by the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY, Muslims intending to pray were prevented from entering the Washington mosque with night sticks and tear gas by the Washington police, and through the efforts of the diplomats of the reactionary Arab regimes. Instead, embassy employees and other parasites from the reactionary Arab regimes, under heavy protection from the fascist American police, contaminated the pure grounds of the mosque with their own presence and held a separate so-called Friday prayer service under the leadership of a clerical pretender from the Saudi court named 'Adel 'Asir.

While the police rudely prevented Muslim brothers and sisters from even entering the mosque, news reporters were sent into the mosque to take pictures and write articles for publication in the American press that would lead American Muslims to believe that the diplomats from reactionary Arab countries even pray, and to provide an endorsement for their Americanized Islam. At the same time, Muslims gathered on both sides of the mosque demanding the removal of the American police from the House of God. Accompanied by brother Mohammad al-Masi, the Friday Imam of Washington,

they held the Friday prayer service while being tightly cordoned by the police. The Washington Friday Imam said during his sermon: In a land whose leaders claim to allow freedom of speech and religion, just as you can see, police columns have surrounded us and prevented us from going inside the mosque. He added: We are ready to talk with whoever says we are mistaken at any time and place.

The Friday Imam of Washington then said: Do they want to deny us the right to pray in the mosque and on the sidewalk in front of it? All these violations are being committed by American executive officials before the eyes of the American people. Last Monday they came into our house of prayer with their shoes on and even arrested one person. If they allow us to pursue this matter we will find other ways to do so, and we can assure them that no desecration of our faith will occur.

On the other hand, one of the brothers who managed to get into the mosque somehow told the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY's correspondent that the police were even inside the mosque, and that the Royal Saudi Ambassador was in the mosque strutting around with the others, most of whom had arrived ceremoniously in fancy new automobiles dressed in expensive finery.

According to reports, after the conclusion of this prayer service, the reactionary Arab diplomats left the mosque under heavy police protection. At that same time, the Muslim brothers and sisters, who had just finished the Friday prayer and were chanting slogans, turned to these people and chanted the slogans "shame on you," "Middle Eastern kings are tools of imperialism," and "God is great."

9310

CSO:4640/298

STATUS OF INDUSTRIES IN SISTAN-BALUCHESTAN REPORTED

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 21 Jul 83 p 13

[Interviews with head of the budget and plan organization and general manager of the industries of Sistan-Baluchestan by IRNA; date and place not specified]

[Text] The existing talents in the industrial sector throughout Sistan-Baluchestan and the severe shortage of industrial units in Sistan-Baluchestan Province call for industrial activity and large scale investments.

Considering the existing resources and the needs of the Province in the four areas of sea, mining, agricultural and services industries, there is a felt need for correct planning in the area of industrial development in this Province.

Considering the existing talents in the industrial sector throughout Sistan-Baluchestan and the severe shortage in the area of industry, the Province of Sistan-Baluchestan requires industrial activity and large investments.

In order to be able to describe the industrial situation of Sistan-Baluchestan Province, the correspondents of the IRNA in Zahedan held separate interviews with the head of the budget and plan organization and the general manager of the industries of Sistan-Baluchestan. Concerning the situation with regard to the existing industries throughout Sistan-Baluchestan Province, the head of the budget and plan organization said:

Food Industries Sector

In the food industries sector, 26 industrial units with about 1,370 billion rials in capital, which is 10.7 percent of the total industrial investments in the Province, are in operation.

A total of 161 people are employed in this sector and the level of dependence of this sector is 91 percent.

Textile and Clothing Industries Sector

In the textile and clothing industries sector, [no missing] units, of which 3 are governmental and the remainder cooperative, are in operation with 8.34 billion rials in capital. The level of dependence of this sector, in which 472 persons are active, is 55 percent. He mentioned Faraqir-e Baft-e Baluch factory as the most important unit in this sector, considering it unique in the Middle East. Once it begins operation, this factory will be able to produce 28 million meters of various fabrics annually.

Chemical Industries Sector

The head of the budget and plan organization mentioned the existing units in the chemical industries sector, including the oxygen, plastic bag and melamine dish production units, with a total of 40 million rials in capital and 27 workers. He announced the degree of dependence of this sector as 65 percent.

Non-Metal, Mineral and Celluloid Industries Sector

He also mentioned the capital of the non-metal, mineral and Celluloid industries sector, which has 125 production units with 1,962 workers and 3.27 billion rials in capital. He said that this sector holds 25.7 percent of the total industrial investments of the Province. Of its capital, 1.86 billion rials belongs to the government sector and the remainder from the private sector. The dependence of this sector is 10 percent.

Electrical Industries Sector

He reported the total investment in this sector, which includes 2 production units, as 10 million rials and the level of dependence of this sector as 75 percent.

Metal Industries

The metal industries sector has 11 production units and capital amounting to 1 billion rials. The degree of dependence of this sector is 76 percent.

Mechanical Industries

The mechanical industries sector includes 3 repair shop units with a capital of 5 million rials and 15 workers. The head of the budget and plan organization considered the industrial growth in this province very poor, resulting from the incorrect policies of the previous regime despite the talents and resources existing

throughout Sistan-Baluchestan. He mentioned the existing shortages and problems as resulting from the weakness of the fundamental resources, the severe shortage of expert forces, the dispersed manpower due to the vastness of the Province and the lack of an appropriate moderate climate throughout the Province. He emphasized the strongly felt need in this Province for correct planning for industrial development.

The head of the budget and plan organization of Sistan-Baluchestan mentioned in conclusion the proposed plans of the experts of this organization and other responsible organizations in this sector, taking into consideration the existing resources and needs of the Province in the four general areas of sea, mineral, agricultural and service industries. He recounted these projects mainly as: the development of Chahbahar Port, presently under way; the creation of repair shops for ships and boats, making use of the resources of the Chahbahar naval academy, the Persian Gulf ship building factory and the Islamic Republic shipping company for training a committed force; activating the plan for the creation of a cement factory in this Province, on which studies began some time ago; the development of excavation, operation, melting and copper and chromite conversion industries, with consideration for the existing resources of newly discovered mines; the development of medium and small industries, such as for the manufacture of pressed wood, flour, bricks, lime, cables, switches and fuses, and moulding and machinery, through providing loans and partnerships to the proper applicants; cooperation and aid to the centers for services, production and developmental expansion, considering the role of the cooperative system in the economy of the country; the creation and expansion of agricultural industries, such as canning and fruit juice factories, a sugar factory, factories for extracting alcohol from dates, with consideration for the existing agricultural capabilities; the expansion of technical and industrial cooperation with Pakistan and India, considering the common borders and cultures and the exchange of technical knowledge and experience with them. Also, the general manager of the industries of Sistan-Baluchestan, in another interview with the IRNA correspondent of Zahedan, referred to the capability for great expansion in this Province in various industrial sectors and said: At the present time, only 85 industrial units, with 25 billion rials in capital, are active throughout this Province, of which 55 units were established after the victory of the Islamic revolution with direct government support.

He also announced that due to the severe shortages of various industries in Sistan-Baluchestan, such industries as chemical, plastic manufacturing and textile industries as well as some food industries which have been forbidden in other areas of the country will be permitted for establishment in Sistan-Baluchestan. He asked the people throughout the country,

considering the extreme need of Sistan-Baluchestan for industrial growth, to take utmost advantage of the government financial aid and the easy conditions which have been set for the development of industry in this Province and, more than ever before, to eliminate deprivation from this Province through their efforts towards industrial growth.

In conclusion, he said: Last year, with the extensive support of volunteers, 69 industrial projects were implemented and 3 billion rials in capital were allocated, of which 2.5 billion was put at the disposal of the volunteers.

10,000
CSO: 4640/300

HEALTH MINISTER VISITS CUBAN HEALTH, TREATMENT CENTERS

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 16 Jul 83 p 15

[Text] Dr Hadi Manafi, minister of health, who has been heading a delegation participating in the conference for health for all in Cuba held in Havana since 7 July, met and had talks with the Cuban vice president and the Cuban president of the Council of Ministers.

Moreover, part of the above delegation headed by Amir Hasan Haj Tarhani, a member of the planning council of the Ministry of Health, is going to Caracas to familiarize itself with the health situation in Venezuela. For this same purpose, the acting charge d'affaires of the Iran Islamic Republic Embassy in Caracas met for talks with the minister of health of Venezuela. The delegation of the Ministry of Health of our country visited various hospitals and clinical centers in Cuba during its stay in that country to participate in the conference for health for all, which was attended by 60 countries.

Dr Manafi, the minister of health of our country, also took part in a press conference in Havana. He answered questions by newsmen about the results of his visits to health and clinical installations, his talks with Cuban health authorities and health goals and programs in Iran. During the press conference, Dr Manafi described the shortcomings and difficulties in the field of health and medicine that still exist in our country from the previous regime and compared them with the health and medical difficulties faced by Cuba in the early years after the victory of the Cuban revolution.

Dr Manafi also enumerated the difficulties and restrictions deriving from the imposed war against Iran by the Baathist Zionist regime of Iraq, which has prevented the prompt launching of health programs throughout the country.

CSO: 4640/286

DECISIONS OF MEETING ON CONSTRUCTION, RENOVATION REPORTED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 16 Jul 83 p 16

[Text] The 58th meeting of the central headquarters for the reconstruction and renovation of war-torn regions convened at the Ministry of Interior with the participation of the members of central headquarters. According to the report of the public relations department of the Ministry of Interior, the coordination of the program for reconstruction and renovation in the 5-year national development plan was reviewed and discussed at this meeting. It was determined that the planning committees for coordination and assimilation of policies pertaining to reconstruction and renovation that are in accordance with the 5-year plans should be reviewed. Also at that meeting the membership of the high council for agriculture at the rural committees of central headquarters, as well as the membership of the foundation for refugee affairs in the areas torn by the imposed war in the urban committees and the plan organization membership in the rural committees were approved.

Moreover, the plan for the reconstruction of the City Hall building and street asphalting in Abadan, the plan for setting up city bus lines and the survey for the construction of the new bridge over the Bahmanshir River were approved through the granting of a credit in the amount of 1,610 million rials. The reconstruction of the Shohada Hospital, the sugar warehouse, City Hall, the implementation of a number of other plans in the city of Dezful through the granting of a credit in the amount of 644,436 million rials are among other ratifications that took place at this meeting.

CSO: 4640/287

GENDARMERIE HEAD ON SMUGGLING, SECURITY ACTIVITIES

GF272022 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1400 GMT 27 Jul 83

[Report on interview with Col Kuchakzadeh, commander of the Gendarmerie of the Islamic Republic of Iran by Central News Unit correspondent in Shiraz-- date not given]

[Text] The commander of the Gendarmerie of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in reply to the question on what steps the gendarmerie of our country has taken to reconstruct the liberated border posts said: God willing, as per the Jerusalem Operation and the liberation of Susangerd, the very first company which offered sacrifices, was the company of the gendarmerie. During the last year 32 posts have been reconstructed and here we will also be active and start the work.

Col Kuchakzadeh was asked what steps the gendarmerie will take with respect to combating smuggling in the border regions. He said: During the seminar which was held with the participation of the regional commanders and the officials of the political-ideological departments a couple of month ago in Tehran, the gendarmerie has named this year as year for border security and the campaign against smuggling. Since setting up the necessary gendarmerie companies during the last 4 months, 3 and 1/2 tons of narcotics drugs have been discovered by the gendarmerie brothers.

The commander of the gendarmerie of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while reiterating the political, social, and moral aspects of smuggling, said: During the last few weeks, with the cooperation of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps brothers more than 450 kg of heroin was seized in a clash with international smugglers. In this clash and in another similar clash, some were killed and some were wounded. In conclusion he stressed: God willing, we will remove this corruption from our Islamic society this year.

In answer to another question on what steps have been taken by the gendarmerie to man the posts for the security of the country he said: Thirty-six battalions have been set up. Half of them have been posted in the east from [word indistinct] to the borders of Khorasan. Two battalions are posted in Kordestan and five battalions have been posted in west Azarbayan and at other places also like Naghede, Jolfa, (Pol), Garneh, Saveh and [word indistinct] plans have been made to post gendarmerie forces. In addition to providing for the

security of the borders of our country, these forces will help the Islamic combatants. He noted that these forces will be equipped with heavy arms, armored carriers, and air personnel carriers. They will prepare to defend the borders of our homeland and will also be responsible for campaigning against smuggling on the borders.

CSO: 4640/285

1983-84 BUDGET DICTATED BY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CIRCLES

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 14 Jun 83 Magazine p 1

[Special Analysis by Asadullah Ghalib: "Pros and Cons of the 1983-84 Budget"]

[Text] The sixth budget of the martial law government was finally presented to the Advisory Council by Minister of Finance Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan, but the debate on the budget was postponed for 1 month. But the common people failed to understand the reason for "the 1-day exercise" of the members of the Advisory Council." One thing is certain: The budget has gone into effect and the Advisory Council, except for rhetoric, is not expected to take any action.

Official circles, chambers of commerce and industry and stock exchange representatives calling it a balanced budget have criticized it mildly. But economic experts and the people in general have termed it an extremely disappointing budget. According to one financial adviser, it would be more appropriate to call it a "mini-budget" because certain measures, such as increased salaries and custom tariffs are still under consideration. These measures when implemented will change the statistical calculations completely. One economic observer says that this budget has been prepared in the traditional manner and the sources of revenue are the same as those that already constitute the basis of such budgets. Circles interested in Islamic economy have been disappointed by the fact that the finance minister, in presenting the budget was content to provide a collective assessment of the government's previous measures, whereas in view of official claims regarding the introduction of an Islamic system of administration and in order to fulfill the Islamic demands for social justice and equality, it was imperative to declare ultrarevolutionary measures. Muslims of Pakistan would have welcomed them cheerfully because they are in search of a goal that was the dream of hundreds of thousands of Muslims who have made sacrifices for the Pakistani movement.

The new budget presented by Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan, besides increasing the cost of living of the Pakistani people also increased inflation. The nation deserves appreciation for having ungrudgingly accepted a budget prepared by world financial institutions and foreign hands. Frankly, the nation has no right to either accept or reject it. The destiny of the people has been tied up with the World Bank and International Monetary

nd. When these world institutions take upon themselves the responsibility to provide financial needs of the Pakistani people, then they also impose their own terms and conditions. One cannot expect the world institutions to want Pakistan to stand on its own and Pakistani products to be able to compete with external imports. Therefore, they provide loans and aid after making sure that Pakistan accepts their conditions for increasing production costs. An economic expert in the former government has even demanded that since the whole world is aware of the conditions on the basis of which our Ministry of Finance has been receiving foreign loans, why have the Pakistani people been kept in the dark. The real reason for the increase in the prices of oil, gas, train tickets, fertilizer, etc. is to increase the cost of production so that Pakistani products become more expensive compared with imported products. Those who are aware of the domestic secret even say that not much has been done and that there is yet much more to come. Wait, they say, and see what happens next and the prices of which products are increased. It is said that these increases are indispensable for the country's economy.

One reason why it is difficult to call the new budget agreeable is that compared with last year expenditures for development have been dramatically reduced. According to the draft budget, development expenditures for 1982-83 were 3.47 billion rupees, whereas in the new budget they total only 310 million rupees; keeping in mind the existing inflation, this amount becomes much less compared with last year.

Fifty-four percent of the development budget depends on foreign loans and aid. Although special geographical and political conditions on our borders today are in our favor and foreign aid is being channelled to Pakistan, it does not take long for political changes to take place. Should this happen, then 54% of the development work would be jeopardized.

Our finance minister, an expert in preparing budgets, did not come up to the expectations of the working class in Pakistan. Laborers, skilled workers and salaried people already hard pressed under the burden of the increased cost of living and inflation had been hoping that the new budget would bring about a raise in their salaries thus improving their plight to a certain extent. But all their expectations were dashed to the ground. The finance minister not only avoided making an announcement to this effect but, on the contrary, by increasing train fares and the price of postage stamps, fertilizers, gas, etc. struck a heavy blow to the common man, specially salaried people.

The financial minister, while speaking of industrial development, did not even refer to labor policy, even though only in the event of industrial peace and a satisfactory relationship between labor and management can there be progress in the industrial sector. The finance minister declared concessions in order to encourage the establishment of new industries in remote and backward areas, but these announcements are little more than gestures. The finance minister knows quite well that the areas he referred to are without electricity, water and gas, which are essential for supplying

raw materials. The idea of extending industrial facilities to the backward areas of the country no doubt is praiseworthy, but to implement this plan, necessary measures would also have to be adopted.

An industrial complex in suburban Lahore has been deprived of electrical power for a number of years for the simple reason that the SAPDA [Water & Power Development Authority] management is demanding 250,000 rupees. If providing electricity for industrial sites is going to be so expensive, then what worldly blessing would be needed to supply electricity to remote areas in the North Western Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan?

One of the welcome features of the budget is the announcement of measures to stimulate the transfer of foreign exchange earnings of Pakistanis living abroad. The truth is that instead of taking advantage of this valuable capital to bring about revolutionary changes leading to the prosperity of the country, it is being used to import luxury items from abroad. There is no plan under consideration nor are there any measures in the current budget that could give rise to the hope that this valuable capital would be used for the industrial growth of the country.

An analysis of the budget shows that it has increased the overall cost of living. By manipulating facts and figures, an attempt has been made to prove that progress in the industrial and social sectors will bring about radical changes in the coming year. But this is wishful thinking. We are far from our goal.

9315
CSO: 4656/207

COMMUNIST PARTY OF SRI LANKA'S ACHIEVEMENTS OVER PAST 40 YEARS EXAMINED

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 1 Jul 83 pp 1, 7

[Text]

Although the Communist Party of Sri Lanka was officially formed on 3rd July, 1943, its origins go back to the start of the 1930s.

This was a watershed period in our country's history. World capitalism had entered a period of major economic crisis, whose devastating effects were soon felt in Sri Lanka. Retrenchment, unemployment and mass misery were the order of the day.

The Working class and the radical intelligentsia were looking for a way out. The basic policy of the bourgeois "national" leaders like D. B. Jayatilleke and D. S. Senanayake namely, achieving national advance through co-operation with British imperialism — had begun to be discredited. The militant trade union movement of the 1920s had been disrupted by the treachery of A. E. Goonesinghe, who, in co-operation with British right-wing social democracy, had deserted the workers.

It was at this time that the late Dr. S. A. Wickremasinghe, the CPSL leader who pioneered the contemporary Left and socialist movement in Sri Lanka, began to acquaint the workers and radical intelligentsia of our country with the scientific socialist ideas of Marxism-Leninism, as well as the achievement of the world's first socialist state, the Soviet Union, that had emerged from the victorious Great October Socialist Revolution.

It can thus be said that the origins of the CPSL go back to the very start of the Left movement in Sri Lanka.

Preparations

After this came more than a decade of preparatory work that led eventually to the formation of the CPSL in 1943.

The workers and radical intelligentsia gained experience in the work of the early youth leagues and socialist study circles (1930-35), in the anti-imperialist, democratic and other mass struggles of the original LSSP (1935 to 1939), and in the work of the precursor to the formation of the CPSL, the UNITED SOCIALIST PARTY (1940 to 1943).

This it can also be said that the formation of the CPSL arose directly out of the experiences of Sri Lanka's revolutionary forces in the 1920s and 1930s.

Another factor which influenced the formation of the CPSL was the increasing knowledge and inspiration of the successes of the Soviet Union in abolishing class and national exploitation, and solving major social problems caused by imperialism and capitalism like unemployment, backwardness, racial strife etc.

Contacts made with the international anti-imperialist, workers' and communist movements also helped this process. The outstanding role played by the Soviet Union and the international communist movement in the fight against fascism and its drive to war also was another factor that exercised considerable influence.

Therefore, the formation of the CPSL in 1943 was an outcome of the merger of national and

international experiences, of the union of Marxism-Leninism with the indigenous working class and radical movement.

In the past 40 years, the CPSL has worked under many different conditions.

It has had experience of both legal and illegal work, of work in Parliament and extra-Parliamentary mass struggles. In Parliament, it worked in Opposition and, even for a short time in government. While most of this experience was positive, some of it was negative too. But even in the latter case, the CPSL had the strength and ability to analyse, publicly admit, and correct its mistakes.

Looking back on the four decades, the CPSL can be proud that there is no major struggle of our people during this period in which Communists have not been in the front line.

This was so in the general strike of 1948, which played a decisive role in the winning of political independence; of Hartal of 1953, which heralded the first defeat of UNP rule and made possible the advances of the democratic and working class movements thereafter; and of innumerable other mass and strike struggles against neo-colonialist and capitalist exploitations, for the expansion of the state sector of the economy, for the improvement of the living standards and working conditions of the masses for democratic and social progress.

Pioneer

The CPSL can also take pride in its pioneer role in developing

friendship with the socialist countries and other front-line anti-imperialist states; in promoting solidarity between the working class and democratic organisations of Sri Lanka and the international working class and democratic movements, in explaining to our people the intimate connection between the world-wide struggles against nuclear war preparations and for disarmament and their struggles for political and economic independence and social progress and in helping to spread the ideas of scientific socialism, of Marxism-Leninism, through the publication and distribution of the classics of Marxism-Leninism and other socialist literature in Sinhala and Tamil, and in other ways.

The impact of the CPSL on the political life of our country has been far greater than its membership or organised influence — a fact that the Party is trying to correct.

The CPSL has helped to sharpen and raise the anti-imperialist consciousness of our people both in respect of the major aggressive role of US imperialism after World War Two, and in respect of the new phenomenon of neo-colonialism, which the transnational corporations and the UNP government are trying to introduce to Sri Lanka in a major way.

In linking the struggles of our people for defending national sovereignty and achieving democratic and social progress with the world struggle for peace and the effort to make the Indian Ocean a peace zone, the CPSL seeks to underline that social progress today is intimately linked with the maintenance of peace on a world and regional scale.

Unity

The CPSL's principle fight of

uphold national unity against racism and other anti-democratic and divisive trends has won it much support.

Its proposals for the solution of the problems of the Sri Lanka Tamils through acceptance of the principles of (a) the right of the Sri Lanka Tamils to self-determination, and (b) exercising this right in a way that does not disrupt the unity of the working people of the country, e.g. through regional autonomy, has won wide acceptance in the Left movement and among the Tamils.

Even today, it is the CPSL which, in the interests of a bringing about a decisive shift from the government's current attempt to find a military and state-terrorist solution to this problem, has proposed the summoning of an All-Parties Conference, together with the organisations of the Tamils, to start the search for a solution through the processes of political dialogue.

In the same way, the CPSL fights for to end the statelessness of over half a million Up-country Tamil state workers, which has lasted for over three decades and in a running sore of Sri Lankan democracy, by giving them the opportunity to become citizens of Sri Lanka on the same basis as its other citizens.

In the working class field the CPSL has not merely helped to build such important trade union centres as the CFTU and the PSTUF, as well as other trade unions in both the public and private sectors, but also spearheaded, through these unions, struggles that have won the workers many of the benefits they enjoy today (e.g. legal minimum wages, aid holidays, sickness benefits, pensions and provident funds etc.), but also pioneered and indefatigably championed the fight for trade union unity.

The Party's contribution to the

fight for Left unity and for wider unity of Left and democratic forces, under working class leadership, has had its ups and downs.

But the steadfast way in which the CPSL has pursued this policy has won its wide respect, notwithstanding the divisions that still exist among these forces and certain mistakes (since corrected) that the CPSL itself made in applying this tactic in the 1970-76 period.

The role played by the CPSL in seeking to forge broad anti-UNP unity at the Presidential elections and the Referendum are recent examples of this.

The contribution of the CPSL to the solution of specific shapers of national policy are also well known.

High up in the list are its pioneering efforts to win the vote at 18; its proposed solutions to the problems of industrialisation, irrigation, hydro-power development and agriculture; its contributions to national policy on housing development, rent control and the protection of tenants; its contributions to the fight for a national system of state education; its fight to safeguard the environmental conditions needed for economic growth etc.

Speaking broadly, it can be said that many important policies for national and social progress which were first put forward by the CPSL have now become the commonly accepted policies of the anti-imperialist and working class movements.

The forty years experience gained in the struggles of the people, and the guiding principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism to which the Communist Party of Sri Lanka has always been dedicated, will help it to perform that task with honour.

NEARLY 300 IN CUSTODY FOLLOWING TRINCOMALEE VIOLENCE

Colombo THE ISLAND in English 1 Jul 83 pp 1, 7

[Text]

Nearly 300 persons have been taken into custody by the police and the security forces in Trincomalee during the last four days.

The arrests were in connection with various incidents of arson and violence that occurred in the area.

Of these, about 200 are reported to be in Army custody while the rest are being held by the police.

Security forces have also recovered a number of weapons and bombs.

Official sources indicated that ten persons had died as a result of the violence while hospital authorities in Trincomalee say there are about 60 people being treated for injuries.

Meanwhile, an injured person who was transferred to Anuradhapura hospital from Trincomalee is said to have been set upon by some persons on the beach when he had gone to buy fish. This person is said to be from Sirimapura, was saved from being buried alive by an eye-witness to the incident it is reported.

During the past 65 hours after the curfew had been withdrawn, no fatal incidents except for some throwing of bombs have been reported from Trincomalee.

However, reports from the security forces that a number of incidents of arson and assault have occurred in Sirimapura, Paduka, Palunnuwa and nearby areas.

Following these reports, mobile patrols are being carried out by the security forces in these areas.

According to reports, a group of persons had thrown bombs at a Police and Navy patrol at Palunnawa on Wednesday.

The police have taken 17 persons into custody in this connection. A cache of petrol bombs and other incendiary weapons have also been taken into custody it is said.

A search of the jungles where the alleged bomb throwers had taken refuge is now being made by the police.

The police have received information that groups of people hiding in these jungles are manufacturing bombs.

The curfew which had continued for 65 hours was lifted at 8 a.m. yesterday and re-imposed at 2 p.m. During the period the curfew was lifted several co-operatives opened for business and large crowds converged on them to buy their requirements.

CSO: 4600/781

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DATE FILMED

August 18, 1983